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PRECEDENT AND SPEECH
Randy J. Kozel*
The U.S. Supreme Court has shown a notable willingness to reconsider its
First Amendment precedents. In recent years, the Court has departed from its
prior statements regarding the constitutional value of false speech. It has re-
vamped its process for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment
protection. It has changed its positions on corporate electioneering and aggre-
gate campaign contributions. In short, it has revised the ground rules of ex-
pressive freedom in ways large and small. The Court generally describes its
past decisions as enjoying a presumption of validity through the doctrine of
stare decisis. This Article contends that within the context of expressive free-
dom, there has been no such presumption. When the Court concludes that a
precedent reflects a cramped vision of expressive liberty, adherence to the past
gives way. Unfettered speech, not legal continuity, is the touchstone.
This practice is understandable. After all, free expression is crucial to political
and social life. Yet departures from precedent can compromise the notion of
constitutional law as enduring and impersonal.
Responding to the tension between legal continuity and the undiluted protec-
tion of speech, this Article defends precedent as a tool for separating the con-
tent of constitutional law from contested matters of interpretive philosophy.
The key premise is that a precedent’s perceived harmfulness should generally
be irrelevant to whether it is retained or overruled. Perspectives on harmful-
ness track underlying interpretive commitments that vary from judge to judge,
creating a conceptual gulf that the doctrine of precedent is meant to bridge
rather than widen.
As an alternative, the Article contends that even within the Court’s existing
framework, a renewed emphasis on principles of concreteness and content sen-
sitivity would facilitate a more nuanced approach to precedent. Such a devel-
opment would embrace the reality that not all speech is created equal—and
not all limitations on speech are equally bad.
Introduction
False statements of fact possess intrinsic constitutional value.1 Excep-
tions to First Amendment protection are based on historical practice rather
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks to Laura Myers for excellent
research and editorial assistance. For helpful comments and conversations, thanks to Amy
Barrett, Will Baude, Joseph Blocher, Sam Bray, Nathan Chapman, Alan Chen, Erin Delaney,
Chad Flanders, Nicole Garnett, Richard Garnett, John Inazu, Leslie Kendrick, Jeffrey
Pojanowski, Alex Tsesis, and Eugene Volokh. I am also grateful for comments by participants
at the 2014 Yale Law School Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, where I presented the
article under its earlier title, Second Thoughts About the First Amendment.
1. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2546–47 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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than evaluation of costs and benefits.2 Corporations enjoy an unfettered
right to praise and criticize political candidates.3 The government may not
restrict citizens’ total contributions to political campaigns during an election
cycle.4
The common thread among these rules is that they were all established
within the last ten years. Indeed, each of the rules conflicts with aspects of
the Supreme Court’s prior case law. Yet the Court saw fit to revise all of
these areas of First Amendment doctrine.
There may be more to come. Several justices have questioned the
Court’s precedents regarding the First Amendment implications of public
sector labor unions.5 Some justices have also urged a fresh look at the
Court’s longstanding approach to broadcast indecency.6 The Court’s latest
word on the line between content-based and content-neutral regulations
likewise suggests a possible revision that could make many restrictions on
speech more difficult to sustain.7 And then there is the pivotal distinction
between campaign contributions, which are subject to regulation, and inde-
pendent political expenditures, which receive robust constitutional protec-
tion. The Court recently preserved that distinction without reaffirming it. A
plurality of justices saw “no need” to reconsider existing doctrine, notwith-
standing calls for its repudiation.8 The uncertainty surrounding campaign
finance law exemplifies the state of expressive liberty more broadly. As much
as the Court has altered the First Amendment landscape over the past dec-
ade, the next few years could be equally dramatic—particularly as a new
justice succeeds Justice Scalia and the possibility of retirements looms.
Among the most notable aspects of the Court’s new principles of free
expression is their genesis. In the opinions that announced the principles,
the Court appeared to give little import to the doctrine of stare decisis,
which generally counsels retaining precedents absent an exceptional basis for
departure.9 In some of the cases, the Court did not discuss stare decisis at all.
2. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2010).
3. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
4. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (plurality opinion).
5. E.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2630–34 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l
Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289–91 (2012).
6. E.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2321 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in the judgment); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 530–35
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
7. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227–31 (2015) (“A law that is content
based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s . . . content-neutral
justification . . . .”).
8. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445. But see id. at 1462–64 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that contribution limits and expenditure limits should both be subject to
strict scrutiny).
9. E.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (“[E]ven in constitutional
cases, the doctrine [of stare decisis] carries such persuasive force that we have always required
a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’ ” (quoting Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring))).
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In others, the Court endorsed fidelity to precedent as an abstract ideal but
concluded that stare decisis should not stand in the way of correcting a con-
stitutional mistake. Back in 2007, Justice Scalia noted that “[t]his Court has
not hesitated to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.”10
That observation has become more resonant with the Court’s recent expan-
sions of expressive freedom at the expense of legal continuity.11
The question is why deference to precedent—a feature the Court has
described as foundational to the rule of law12—is so readily overcome in the
First Amendment context. The answer, this Article contends, is that the
Court has been applying an exceedingly weak version of stare decisis in First
Amendment cases. First Amendment stare decisis stands in tension with the
Court’s more general statements that past decisions must be upheld absent a
special justification for overruling them.13 To the contrary, the Court has
treated precedent as readily giving way to expressive rights.14 In the battle
between speech and stability, speech wins.
In one sense, it is difficult to find anything objectionable in such an
approach.15 Depriving a speaker of her liberty—and, at the same time, im-
poverishing the public discourse to the detriment of society at large—seems
like a high price to pay for allowing the law to remain undisturbed. But the
value of continuity cannot be dismissed so easily. The doctrine of stare deci-
sis can accommodate different perspectives about how best to promote the
free exchange of ideas. A useful illustration, which I will discuss at length
below, is the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. The justices are
deeply divided about the lawfulness of governmental efforts to regulate cam-
paign-related speech. But it is misleading to think of the disagreement as
pitting justices who support unfettered expression against justices who
10. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
11. See Akhil Reed Amar, The First Amendment’s Firstness, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1015,
1028 (2014) (“Never in history have First Amendment freedoms been protected as vigorously
by the Court, and no other set of freedoms today is protected more vigorously.”).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. E.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“[A]n argument
that we got something wrong—even a good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify
scrapping settled precedent. Or otherwise said, it is not alone sufficient that we would decide a
case differently now than we did then.”); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164 (2013)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Of course, under our doctrine of stare decisis, establishing that a
decision was wrong does not, without more, justify overruling it.”); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 757–58 (1988).
14. The Supreme Court has also treated a variety of other values as subordinate to unfet-
tered speech. See Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment:
Alvarez and Knox in the Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 491, 493, 517–24
(2013) (identifying “ways in which expressive autonomy now seems regularly to trump com-
peting constitutional and societal values that have traditionally been given great weight”).
15. See Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 381, 398–99 (2007) (noting that it is not “self-evident that on issues involv-
ing morally or politically important individual rights that we can or should expect Supreme
Court Justices to suppress their own best moral, political, and constitutional judgment to the
values of stability, notice, reliance, or simply being consistent with the past”).
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would allow governments to pursue competing objectives, such as decreas-
ing the amount of money in politics. Instead, the Court’s campaign finance
cases encompass dueling visions of robust political debate: one vision in
which the government’s job is to step aside, and another in which the gov-
ernment must take measures to ensure that everyone has a voice in the polit-
ical process.16
Without meaningful deference to precedent, judicial interpretations of
the First Amendment will fluctuate as these divergent visions compete for
primacy. When there are five votes in favor of the former approach, public
officials will be sharply restricted in their power to regulate campaign-re-
lated speech. If personnel changes on the Court lead to five votes in favor of
the latter approach, public officials will have greater discretion to limit cer-
tain speech in pursuing a healthy and vibrant marketplace of ideas. As the
balance of power on the Court ebbs and flows, so, too, will the First Amend-
ment implications of campaign finance regulation.
Stare decisis reflects a different conception of the law, one in which con-
stitutional rules survive changes in judicial personnel. In contexts such as
campaign finance, deference to precedent lends stability to the Court’s pro-
nouncements about how to protect and promote robust expression. But
even when that is not the case—even when, in other words, standing by
precedent means permitting the restriction of speech in service of some
other value—stare decisis has an important role to play. If the purpose of
stare decisis is to promote the law’s stability, predictability, and impersonal-
ity, the doctrine cannot wilt at the mention of free speech. Sometimes it is
better for the law to remain settled despite its failure to protect expressive
liberty as vigorously as today’s Court may deem appropriate.
I begin in Part I by analyzing the doctrine of stare decisis as the Court
customarily describes it. In Part II, I examine several recent fluctuations in
First Amendment doctrine as well as the possibility of other potential revi-
sions in the years ahead. Along the way, I pay particular attention to the
Court’s attitude toward legal continuity. Part III contends that the recent
First Amendment innovations are best understood as reflecting a specialized,
and diluted, version of stare decisis that applies to situations in which prece-
dent threatens to interfere with expressive liberty. Part IV responds to the
tension between precedent and expression by defending a second-best ap-
proach to stare decisis that is designed to operate in a world of interpretive
disagreement among the justices. At the core of second-best stare decisis is
the recognition that justices will tend to reach different conclusions about
precedent when they hold different philosophies of constitutional interpre-
tation. Determining whether a prior decision is so bad as to warrant over-
ruling entails asking which of the decision’s implications are constitutionally
relevant and which are legally inapposite. That inquiry, in turn, requires an
interpretive theory that distinguishes between relevant and irrelevant (legally
speaking) consequences.
16. See infra Section II.B.
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Yet we cannot assume that interpretive harmony will prevail at the
Court. To the contrary, disagreement among the justices is a fact of life.
Second-best stare decisis responds by reconceptualizing the criteria for over-
ruling in order to break free from underlying disputes over interpretive phi-
losophy. The theory I propose emphasizes considerations such as factual
accuracy, procedural workability, and reliance expectations. Those factors
take the same shape regardless of the interpretive philosophy that a particu-
lar justice applies. Second-best stare decisis also limits the role of a prece-
dent’s substantive impact—for example, the perceived severity of its
intrusion on expressive liberty—as a justification for overruling it. The role
of a precedent’s substantive effects is deeply bound up with an individual
justice’s beliefs about which types of harms are legally relevant. While it may
be appropriate to consider substantive effects in a system marked by wide-
spread interpretive agreement, that practice breaks down in our second-best
world of interpretive pluralism. Understandable though it may be, a focus
on substantive effects and perceived harms makes it more difficult for jus-
tices of different interpretive persuasions to find common ground in the
treatment of precedent.
The second-best approach is more deferential to precedent than the
Court has tended to be in its recent First Amendment cases. But it does not
follow that second-best stare decisis is revolutionary. At the theory’s core is a
desire to make good on the Court’s own description of stare decisis as pro-
moting stability, continuity, and the rule of law.17 Second-best stare decisis is
a means of pursuing those values even when the First Amendment is in play.
As an alternative to second-best stare decisis, Part IV develops two prin-
ciples for ensuring meaningful deference under the Court’s existing ap-
proach to precedent. The first principle is concreteness, which resists the
tendency to describe the harms of speech-restrictive precedents in abstract,
generalized terms. The second principle is content sensitivity, which ac-
knowledges that not all speech is created equal—and not all speech-restric-
tive precedents are equally problematic. Together, these principles provide
the framework for a practicable doctrine of stare decisis. They embody the
premise that in the First Amendment context, as in all others, stare decisis
should be more than a concept frequently invoked but just as frequently
overcome.
I close in Part V by considering whether free speech occupies a unique
place in the constitutional landscape, or whether the elevation of civil liberty
over precedent reflects a broader principle of constitutional law.
I. Principles of Precedent
American courts manage the line between continuity and progress using
the doctrine of stare decisis. Current debates over stare decisis continue to
draw on Justice Brandeis’ famous dichotomy between the value of the law
17. See infra Section IV.A.
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being “settled” and the value of it being “right.”18 The Supreme Court’s at-
tempts at weighing legal resolution against interpretive accuracy have yielded
a “series of prudential and pragmatic considerations” that bear on “the re-
spective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”19 This depiction of
stare decisis as a flexible policy rather than an “inexorable command” does
not mean precedent is immaterial.20 It does, however, make clear that fidelity
to precedent “is capable of being overridden” by countervailing concerns.21
Among the familiar considerations in determining a precedent’s fate are
its procedural workability, its compatibility with related lines of cases, the
accuracy of its factual premises, and the extent to which it has engendered
reliance.22 Other features that crop up from time to time include a prece-
dent’s age,23 the number of justices who voted in its favor,24 and whether it
deals with “procedural and evidentiary rules” as opposed to substantive
rights and obligations.25 In addition, the Court has suggested that a decision
is more vulnerable if it was not “well reasoned”26 and, in particular, if it “has
been proved manifestly erroneous.”27 That inquiry links a precedent’s dura-
bility to the soundness—or, more accurately, the degree of unsoundness—
of its rationale.28
18. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“When considering whether to reexamine a prior erroneous holding, we must balance the
importance of having constitutional questions decided against the importance of having them
decided right.”).
19. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992); see also, e.g., Jill E.
Fisch, The Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 93,
106 (2003) (“In economic terms, we might view the Court as seeking to determine the net
social value of overruling by comparing the benefits obtained through the adoption of the new
legal rule with the costs imposed by overruling.”).
20. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
21. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 570, 581 (2001); see also id. at 581–82 (“That a principle is not
absolute, or that a principle reflects judgments that include concerns of policy, does not entail
that it lacks constitutional authorization.”).
22. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55.
23. E.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792–93 (2009) (noting that the applicable
precedent “is only two decades old, and eliminating it would not upset expectations”).
24. E.g., Payne, 501 U.S. at 828–29.
25. Id. at 828.
26. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 792–93.
27. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and
Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (2001) (“In both the written law . . .
and the unwritten law . . . Americans viewed stare decisis as a way to restrain the ‘arbitrary
discretion’ of courts. But this sort of discretion was thought to exist only within a certain
space, created by the indeterminacy of the external sources of law that courts were supposed to
apply.” (quoting The Federalist No. 78, at 298 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999))).
28. Contra Monaghan, supra note 13, at 758 (“Even an ‘overriding conviction’ of prior
error is not enough; the precedent must have some palpable adverse consequences beyond its
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Understanding the operation of stare decisis requires accounting for
these enumerated factors and the broader principles that frame them. In
constitutional disputes, the judicial task is to consider issues such as worka-
bility and reliance as a means of navigating the overarching tension between
maintaining continuity and correcting mistakes. To guide this analysis, the
Court has emphasized that its default presumption is adherence to prece-
dent.29 There must be a “special justification” above and beyond a prece-
dent’s incorrectness to warrant overruling it.30
II. First Amendment Fluctuations
Notwithstanding the value the Supreme Court customarily ascribes to
stare decisis, the doctrine seems to lose its resonance in the context of free
speech. To illustrate, this Part discusses several recent revisions of the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. In some instances, the Court ex-
pressly discussed stare decisis. In others, the Court did not understand itself
as overruling precedent in a formal sense, even if the result was the re-
orientation of existing law. Whichever path the Court took, the outcome was
the same: speech received protection at the expense of continuity.
A. Corporate Electioneering
In contemporary law and politics, to talk about stare decisis and free
speech is to talk about Citizens United v. FEC.31 Given its immediate impact
and continued prominence, the case hardly needs an introduction.32 Still, a
brief refresher is in order. At issue were provisions of federal law that re-
stricted the political activities of corporations and labor unions.33 Citizens
United involved the application of these restrictions to a documentary about
senator and presidential hopeful Hillary Clinton.34
existence.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Roscoe Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 Fordham L.
Rev. 1, 6 (1941))).
29. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (“Our precedent is to be
respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a
course that is sure error.”).
30. E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (quoting United States v.
IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)).
31. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
32. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 2010,
at A12 (describing President Obama’s criticism of Citizens United at the State of the Union
address); Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, Is There a Silver Lining to Citizens United?, N.Y. Times,
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/opinion/is-there-a-silver-lining-to-citi-
zens-united.html [https://perma.cc/PX57-KKAZ] (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (dis-
cussing the impact of Citizens United).
33. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318–19.
34. Id. at 319–21.
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After the case was argued at the Court, the justices ordered additional
briefing and argument on the status of two precedents.35 The first, Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, upheld a prohibition against the use of
corporate treasury funds to advocate for or against political candidates.36
The second, McConnell v. FEC, applied Austin’s rule in a different statutory
context.37
In Citizens United, a five-justice majority rejected Austin and the corre-
sponding portion of McConnell. The Court explicitly stated that it was re-
considering the holdings of controlling precedents.38 It described its
obligation to respect a past decision “unless the most convincing of reasons
demonstrates that adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error.”39
Ultimately, though, the Court viewed the importance of getting the law right
as overcoming the pull of precedent. It explained that Austin’s rationale was
flawed from the beginning and had been further “undermined” over time.40
The Austin approach relegated corporate speakers to the sidelines despite
their “valuable expertise” and ability to “point out errors or fallacies in
speech of all sorts.”41 The Court also characterized Austin as departing from
cases that came before it.42 Finally, in litigating Citizens United, the govern-
ment had asked the Court to reaffirm Austin’s rule but to ground it in a new
rationale. According to the Court, that request for rehabilitation further di-
luted the respect Austin warranted as a precedent.43
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court commonly emphasizes the role of
reliance interests within the stare decisis calculus.44 The Citizens United ma-
jority recognized the potential relevance of reliance but found that there
were “[n]o serious reliance interests . . . at stake.”45 Under the Austin regime,
corporations had been prohibited from using treasury funds for candidate
advocacy. Giving them a new right would not disrupt their reliance on the
old rules.46
35. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (mem.) (ordering supplemental
briefing).
36. 494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990).
37. 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
38. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
39. Id. at 362.
40. Id. at 363–64.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 363.
43. Id. (“When neither party defends the reasoning of a precedent, the principle of ad-
hering to that precedent through stare decisis is diminished.”); see also id. at 384 (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (“Stare decisis is a doctrine of preservation, not transformation. . . . There is
therefore no basis for the Court to give precedential sway to reasoning that it has never ac-
cepted, simply because that reasoning happens to support a conclusion reached on different
grounds that have since been abandoned or discredited.”).
44. See supra Part I.
45. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (majority opinion).
46. Id.
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What about Congress and the state legislatures that had restricted cor-
porate expenditures under the Austin regime? Did their reliance count for
anything? Justice Stevens thought so, noting in his partial dissent that
“[s]tate legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate corporate elec-
tioneering . . . for more than a century.”47 He added that Congress “relied on
this authority for a comparable stretch of time” and paid particular atten-
tion to Austin in crafting the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.48
These considerations, Justice Stevens reasoned, were significant given the
Court’s prior statements about the relevance of governmental reliance.49 Yet
the justices in the majority saw matters differently. For them, reliance by
Congress and state legislatures was “not a compelling interest for stare
decisis.”50
The majority’s willingness to depart from precedent cohered with its
depiction of the constitutional stakes. In the view of the majority, by treating
corporations differently from other speakers, Austin embraced a profoundly
disconcerting principle. It permitted the government to use its coercive pow-
ers “to command where a person may get his or her information or what
distrusted source he or she may not hear.”51 In so doing, Austin allowed the
government to “use[ ] censorship to control thought.”52 Chief Justice Rob-
erts echoed this point in his concurrence, arguing that Austin’s “logic threat-
ens to undermine our First Amendment jurisprudence and the nature of
public discourse more broadly.”53 He and his colleagues in the majority saw
fit to rectify the Court’s prior mistakes notwithstanding the principle of
stare decisis.54
47. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48. Id. at 411–12.
49. Id. at 411. Justice Stevens relied on Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 (1995)
(plurality opinion), where the plurality noted that “[s]tare decisis has special force when legis-
lators or citizens ‘have acted in reliance on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling
the decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an extensive legislative
response.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 714). For comparable
statements see, for example, Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.)
(recognizing reliance on precedent by “Congress and state legislatures”); Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 567–68 (2002) (plurality opinion) (noting the relevance of legislative
reliance); and Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2652 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (including
in the reliance analysis the fact that “[m]ore than 20 States have enacted statutes” that would
need to be revised or reexamined if the relevant precedent were overruled).
50. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (majority opinion).
51. Id. at 356.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 382 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
54. For a competing account, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative
Judicial Activism, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 485, 488–89 (arguing that “[a]lthough the majority
made a half-hearted effort to legitimize its decision to overrule [the relevant] precedents, the
plain and simple fact is that nothing had really changed in the intervening years—except the
makeup of the Court itself” (footnote omitted)).
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B. Campaign Contributions
The expenditure limits at issue in Citizens United are only part of the
story of campaign finance regulation. There is also the matter of political
contributions.
As the Court explained in Buckley v. Valeo, expenditure limits must sur-
vive “exacting scrutiny.”55 This standard is tantamount to strict scrutiny,
which requires the government to cite a compelling interest for the restric-
tion and pursue that interest in the least restrictive way possible.56 The gov-
ernment has a freer hand to regulate campaign contributions. Contribution
limits are permissible so long as the government is pursuing a “sufficiently
important interest” and uses “closely drawn” means.57
The rules for regulating campaign contributions moved to the fore-
ground in McCutcheon v. FEC.58 The Court held that limits on a donor’s
total contributions during an election cycle are unlawful.59 A plurality of
justices reasoned that the “[g]overnment may no more restrict how many
candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how
many candidates it may endorse.”60
McCutcheon’s holding was inconsistent with Buckley, which upheld ag-
gregate limits in the face of a challenge.61 But according to the McCutcheon
plurality, Buckley’s discussion of aggregate limits was not entitled to defer-
ence because the issue received “a total of three sentences” of analysis that
“were written without the benefit of full briefing or argument on the is-
sue.”62 Further, the “legal backdrop” had changed since the time of Buckley,
including through the creation of “more targeted anticircumvention mea-
sures” that made limits on aggregate contributions seem “heavy-handed.”63
In light of these factors, the McCutcheon plurality departed from Buckley’s
approach to aggregate contribution limits.
It is worth noting that McCutcheon did not go as far as it could have in
reconsidering precedent. The parties and amici had devoted “significant en-
ergy” to debating whether the distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures is sound.64 Justice Thomas responded by explaining his view that
contribution limits are every bit as suspect as expenditure limits.65 Yet the
plurality declined the invitation to reconsider the standard of review for
contributions. It reasoned that because the aggregate contribution limits
55. 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam).
56. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.
57. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
58. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
59. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 1448.
61. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
62. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446–47 (plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 1446.
64. Id. at 1445.
65. Id. at 1463–64 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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could not meet the standard set forth in Buckley, there was no need to con-
sider whether a more demanding standard was appropriate.66
While the plurality refused to renounce the distinction between contri-
butions and expenditures, neither did it explicitly endorse Buckley’s ap-
proach. It is natural to wonder if a further revision to the Court’s campaign
finance jurisprudence is in the offing. Among the uncertainties is whether,
in light of the Court’s recent emphasis on unfettered expression and the
need for a wide-open democratic dialogue, Buckley’s portrayal of contribu-
tion limits as “only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to
engage in free communication” continues to hold sway.67 By way of compar-
ison, consider the McCutcheon plurality’s statement that “[t]here is no right
more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing our
political leaders,” including by “contribut[ing] to a candidate’s campaign.”68
For now, the fate of contribution limits remains a matter of speculation.
Such speculation will undoubtedly be influenced by presidential elections
and the comings and goings of justices to and from the Court. Absent a
meaningful doctrine of precedent, those comings and goings will determine
whether the Court revises the law of campaign contributions in the years
ahead.
C. Falsehood
Whether they are bland or incendiary, accurate statements receive pre-
sumptive First Amendment protection. Such statements, the thinking goes,
enrich the marketplace of ideas to the benefit of society at large.
But what about false statements? In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan the
Court held that in certain defamation suits by government officials, it is not
enough for the plaintiff to show that the offending speech was false.69 The
defendant must have acted with knowledge of the statement’s falsity or reck-
less disregard for its accuracy.70 Some of Sullivan’s language characterized
the protection of falsehood as prophylactic. Robust debate “inevitab[ly]”
will lead to mistakes, and the chilling effect would be too great if every utter-
ance created the prospect of liability.71 But the Court also indicated that false
speech possesses intrinsic value: the marketplace of ideas operates more ef-
fectively with falsity in the mix, because the juxtaposition of falsehood leads
to a “clearer perception and livelier impression of truth.”72
In the ensuing years, the Court focused on the prophylactic justification
for Sullivan and distanced itself from the idea that false speech is inherently
66. Id. at 1445–46 (plurality opinion).
67. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1976) (per curiam).
68. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440–41 (plurality opinion).
69. 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
70. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
71. Id. at 271–72.
72. Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 15 (Oxford: Blackwell,
1946) (1859)).
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valuable. Within the field of defamation law, the Court underscored that
“there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”73 It reiterated
this principle in other contexts, for example by noting that “[u]ntruthful
speech . . . has never been protected for its own sake”74 and that false state-
ments are “particularly valueless.”75 The takeaway seemed to be that al-
though falsity disrupts the marketplace of ideas, its protection is necessary to
avoid chilling truthful speech.
This understanding changed with United States v. Alvarez, which invali-
dated a prohibition against false claims of military commendation.76 Though
the Alvarez plurality recognized language in the Court’s decisions indicating
that false speech is valueless, it cautioned that such language must be viewed
in context. According to the Alvarez plurality, the Court’s prior decisions
related only to issues of “defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable
harm associated with a false statement.”77 While falsity “was not irrelevant”
to those decisions, “neither was it determinative.”78 The plurality concluded
that there had never been a “categorical rule” denying the constitutional
value of false speech.79
Concerns about continuity played little role in the Alvarez analysis. The
focal points were dedication to robust expression and distrust of govern-
ment intervention. The plurality held up Alvarez—a case involving deliber-
ate lies that did nothing to enrich understandings or advance debates—as
“illustrat[ing], in a fundamental way, the reasons for the Law’s distrust of
content-based speech prohibitions.”80 For the plurality, it was but a short
step from prohibiting lies about military service to validating “Oceania’s
Ministry of Truth.”81 At stake was nothing less than the government’s “broad
censorial power” over its citizens.82 As in cases like Citizens United, stability
and legal continuity were simply no match for fears about government
orthodoxy.
D. Exceptions to Protection
Not all speech is entitled to First Amendment protection. Restrictions
on certain categories of speech do not offend the Constitution. Obscenity,
73. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
74. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976) (discussing falsity in a case dealing with commercial speech).
75. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (discussing falsity in a case
dealing with intentional infliction of emotional distress).
76. 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2542–43 (2012) (plurality opinion).
77. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544–45.
78. Id. at 2545.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2547.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2547–48.
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threats, and incitement are among the familiar examples.83 The government
possesses considerable discretion to restrict these types of speech.84 That dis-
cretion is particularly significant for content-based regulations that would
otherwise face the rigors of strict scrutiny.85
For decades, the Court’s case law suggested that one way to identify
exceptions to protection was through a systematic analysis of costs and ben-
efits.86 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court noted that “ ‘fighting’
words[ ] . . . which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace” can be punished without raising First
Amendment concerns.87 The Court reasoned that fighting words “are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas,” and their “slight social value . . . is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”88 Chaplin-
sky’s broader lesson appeared to be that “there are some categories of speech
that are not covered by the First Amendment” because the relevant speech
“is not worth it.”89 If a particular category of speech causes great harm but
83. E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . per-
mits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’ ” (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)
(per curiam))); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 19–20 (1973) (“[W]e are called on to define
the standards which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may regulate with-
out infringing on the First Amendment as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (“[T]he consti-
tutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”);
Alexander Tsesis, The Categorical Free Speech Doctrine and Contextualization, 65 Emory L.J.
495, 506 (2015).
84. There is a limited exception for situations in which the government makes content-
based distinctions within a given category of unprotected speech. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 383–84 (1992) (“[T]he government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the
further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.”).
85. E.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (“Because the [rele-
vant statute] imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid unless
California can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, unless it is justified by a
compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”).
86. E.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 385–86, 388 (2009) (noting that certain types of speech “are
thought to be entirely outside the bounds of the [First] Amendment, and no balancing is
required to suppress them in a given case. But importantly, the boundaries of these categorical
exclusions may be a result of balancing” (footnotes omitted)).
87. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
88. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; cf. Zechariah Chafee Jr., Free Speech in the United
States 150 (1941) (“The true explanation is that profanity and indecent talk and pictures,
which do not form an essential part of any exposition of ideas, have a very slight social value as
a step toward truth, which is clearly outweighed by the social interests in order, morality, the
training of the young, and the peace of mind of those who hear and see.”).
89. Mark Tushnet, The First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. Legal Analysis 103, 113
(2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
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produces only meager benefits, cost-benefit analysis might justify
restriction.90
In New York v. Ferber, a case dealing with the prohibition of child por-
nography, the Court again referred to its practice of dispensing with “case-
by-case adjudication” for categories of speech in which “the evil to be re-
stricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at
stake.”91 Ten years later, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul reiterated that the First
Amendment permits content-based regulation when the harms flowing
from a category of speech clearly outweigh the benefits.92 And the Court
followed suit in 2007 by explaining that obscenity and defamation are un-
protected “because the social interest in order and morality outweighs the
negligible contribution of those categories of speech to the marketplace of
ideas.”93
The landscape changed in 2010 with the Court’s decision in United
States v. Stevens.94 Stevens involved a federal statute directed at depictions of
animal cruelty.95 One of the Solicitor General’s arguments in defending the
statute was that such depictions should be denied protection based “upon a
categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.”96
Despite its endorsement of cost-benefit analysis in prior cases, the Court
rejected the Solicitor General’s contention. The Court acknowledged that it
had “described historically unprotected categories of speech” as characterized
by high costs and meager benefits.97 Nevertheless, the Court explained that
those descriptions should not be understood as a legal rule. Rather, the
proper question is whether a category of speech has been “historically un-
protected.”98 Without a basis in history, no amount of cost-benefit analysis
can justify the denial of protection.
To the Stevens majority, the previous regime for identifying First
Amendment exceptions did not do enough to protect speakers’ rights. In the
words of Stevens, the application of cost-benefit analysis is not just wrong; it
is “startling and dangerous.”99 Such an approach contravenes the balance
90. Blocher, supra note 86, at 394 (“This is a balancing method (‘outweighed’) but a
categorical result (exclusion from coverage), and it is informed by First Amendment values
(the value of the ‘exposition of ideas’ and the ‘social value as a step to truth’).” (quoting
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572)).
91. 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (“When a definable class
of material . . . bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is permis-
sible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”).
92. 505 U.S. 377, 382–83 (1992).
93. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007).
94. 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
95. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464–65.
96. Id. at 470 (quoting Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460 (2010) (No. 08-769)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
February 2017] Precedent and Speech 453
struck by the First Amendment itself, which “reflects a judgment by the
American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government out-
weigh the costs.”100 Only by limiting First Amendment exceptions to “long-
established categor[ies]” could the Court quell the threat posed by cost-ben-
efit analysis and “highly manipulable balancing test[s].”101 The statements to
the contrary in the Court’s prior decisions could not shake the resolve of the
Stevens majority.
E. More to Come?
Political speech, false speech, and exceptions to protection are just some
of the areas of First Amendment jurisprudence the Court has reappraised in
recent years. This Section describes several other domains in which the
Court has either begun the process of revision or raised the possibility of
changes to come.
1. Labor Unions
The interplay between speech and precedent has pervaded the Court’s
recent inquiries into the financing of public sector labor unions. Knox v.
Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 involved a union’s imposi-
tion of special assessments for unanticipated political expenses.102 The Court
concluded that such assessments cannot be imposed on objecting employees
who do not belong to the union.103 Nor is it enough for a union to give
nonmembers the power to opt out. Instead, nonmembers must indicate
their “affirmative consent” to contribute.104 The Court explained that requir-
ing nonmembers to opt out increases the risk of their money being chan-
neled toward “political and ideological ends with which they do not
agree.”105
Based on its treatment of opt-out requirements in the context of special
assessments, Knox seemed to anticipate reconsideration of the broader rule
that public employees may be required to opt out of funding a union’s polit-
ical and ideological activities.106 More fundamentally, Knox raised the ques-
tion whether the Court was correct when it ruled in 1977 that public unions
100. Id.
101. Id. at 471–72.
102. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
103. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2295.
104. Id. at 2296.
105. Id. at 2290.
106. See Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political Speech: A Re-
sponse to Professor Sachs, 112 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 206, 210 (2012) (“As long as the under-
lying issue is the alleged compulsion of nonmembers to contribute to political causes against
their will, the Court will continue to make it more difficult for the union to collect these
funds. The Court opined in Knox that an opt-out rule ‘represents a remarkable boon for
unions.’ Such a boon will likely not last for long.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Knox, 132 S. Ct.
at 2290)); Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After
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may demand fees from nonmembers to support collective bargaining.107 The
case responsible for that rule, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,108 drew
criticism from the Knox majority as validating “a form of compelled speech
and association”109 that leads to a “significant impingement on First Amend-
ment rights.”110 Knox gave new salience to the possibility that public employ-
ees may refuse to contribute money to labor unions.
The issue of compelled funding arose fast on the footsteps of Knox in
Harris v. Quinn.111 In Harris, a majority of justices renewed their disapproval
of Abood’s regime. The majority’s analysis included a litany of factors that
customarily appear in explanations of why a flawed precedent is being over-
ruled—factors including factual accuracy, procedural workability, and con-
sistency with prior cases.112 Writing in dissent, Justice Kagan responded in
kind by emphasizing that “governments and unions across the country have
entered into thousands of contracts involving millions of employees in reli-
ance on Abood.”113 Her reasoning drew on the Court’s established practice of
considering reliance implications when deciding whether to overrule a
precedent.114
As in Citizens United, the interplay between speech and precedent had
moved to center stage. But when the curtain fell, Abood remained intact. The
Harris majority concluded that the case before it did not require overruling
Abood.115 It only required a refusal to extend Abood to a new factual
setting.116
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1023, 1040 (2013) (“Knox goes beyond any-
thing the Court previously held by concluding that the First Amendment requires an opt-in
regime with respect to certain forms of union fees. . . . Moreover the Court’s majority sug-
gested in dicta that its reasoning would apply not only to the special assessment at issue in that
case but might also apply to all union fundraising from represented employees, including
annual dues and fees.”).
107. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the “intense political
debate” over “whether, the extent to which, and the circumstances under which a union that
represents nonmembers in collective bargaining can require those nonmembers to help pay for
the union’s (constitutionally chargeable) collective-bargaining expenses”); Fisk & Chemerin-
sky, supra note 106, at 1028 (arguing that the Court’s “expansive dicta” in Knox “has poten-
tially enormous implications for the rights of public employees to bargain collectively and to
participate in politics through their unions”).
108. 431 U.S. 209 (1977); see also Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political
Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 800, 815–16 (2012) (summarizing
the rule of Abood as follows: “While compelled support for [collective bargaining and contract
administration activities] passed constitutional muster, compelled support for union political
activity did not” (footnote omitted)).
109. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289.
110. Id. (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)).
111. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
112. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632–34.
113. Id. at 2652 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
114. See supra Part I.
115. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2638 n.19.
116. Id. at 2638.
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For a time, it looked as though a resolution was close at hand. In 2015,
the Court granted certiorari in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association,
which presented the question whether Abood “should be overruled and pub-
lic-sector ‘agency shop’ arrangements invalidated under the First Amend-
ment.”117 It seemed possible, and perhaps even likely, that the Court would
overrule Abood once and for all. But that was before the death of Justice
Scalia in February of 2016. Several weeks after his passing, the Court split
four-to-four in Friedrichs and affirmed the decision under review without
addressing its merits.118 Abood remains good law, at least until another jus-
tice is appointed and the issue is reopened. Even so, by approaching the
precipice of an overruling, the Court provided further evidence of the power
of expressive freedom (as understood by a majority of sitting justices) to
overwhelm established precedent.
2. Political Protesting
McCullen v. Coakley dealt with a Massachusetts law that restricted
speech within thirty-five feet of the entrances, exits, and driveways of abor-
tion clinics.119 Challengers to the law claimed that it foreclosed efforts to
provide counseling “through up-close, gentle conversations.”120 The First
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument, deeming the law a “valid
time-place-manner regulation” that left open adequate channels of
communication.121
In reaching its decision, the First Circuit relied in part on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Hill v. Colorado.122 In Hill, a divided Court upheld a law
that regulated the areas surrounding healthcare facilities by prohibiting any
person from approaching someone else in order to distribute literature or
“engag[e] in oral protest, education, or counseling.”123 The Hill majority
treated the statute as a content-neutral restriction justified by “the State’s
interest in protecting access and privacy.”124 In contrast, the dissenters char-
acterized the statute as a serious imposition on core expression.125 As Justice
Kennedy put it, the majority went astray by “approv[ing] a law which bars a
117. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083
(2016) (mem.) (per curiam) (No. 14-915).
118. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
119. 708 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2013), rev’d, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
120. McCullen, 708 F.3d at 12.
121. Id. at 14.
122. Id. at 12–14 (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000)).
123. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000) (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-122(3)
(1999)).
124. Id. at 719–20.
125. See id. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 765 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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private citizen from passing a message, in a peaceful manner and on a
profound moral issue, to a fellow citizen on a public sidewalk.”126
McCullen put Hill’s validity back in front of the Court. The challengers
to the Massachusetts law contended that if Hill stood in the way of invalidat-
ing the law, the Court should take the opportunity to limit or overrule Hill
itself.127 They argued that “Hill has proved to be badly reasoned, out of step
with the Court’s other First Amendment jurisprudence, and unworkable or
destructive in practice.”128
Though a majority of justices voted to strike down the Massachusetts
law, they did not go so far as to overrule Hill.129 Instead, the majority held
the Massachusetts statute was not narrowly tailored to advance the govern-
ment’s asserted interests.130 Hill did not factor heavily into the Court’s analy-
sis, though one point was clear: as compared to the Colorado law at issue in
Hill, the Massachusetts law in McCullen effectively forced speakers to stand
significantly farther away from the people they wished to address.131 The
McCullen Court concluded that, given the Massachusetts law’s impact on
expressive liberty, the Commonwealth had “too readily forgone options that
could serve its interests just as well, without substantially burdening the kind
of speech in which [the speakers] wish to engage.”132
At the end of the day, Hill had survived. Indeed, the majority echoed
Hill’s conclusion that restrictions on protesting or counseling outside abor-
tion clinics can be content-neutral rather than content-based—a distinction
that is relevant to the validity of restrictions that are narrower than the law
struck down in McCullen.133 Given the Court’s refusal to overrule Hill, Mc-
Cullen may appear to represent a rare victory of stare decisis over unfettered
speech. But three aspects of McCullen complicate that conclusion. First, the
McCullen majority did not explicitly reaffirm Hill on stare decisis grounds.
Second, although no justice advanced a stare decisis argument in favor of
Hill, three justices expressed their desire to reject that decision. Writing for
126. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Restrictive views of
the First Amendment that have been in dissent since the 1930’s suddenly find themselves in
the majority.”).
127. Brief for Petitioners at 53–56, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-
1168).
128. Id. at 54.
129. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014) (“Respondents assert undeniably
significant interests in maintaining public safety on . . . streets and sidewalks, as well as in
preserving access to adjacent healthcare facilities. But here the Commonwealth has pursued
those interests by the extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a traditional public
forum to all speakers.”); id. at 2545 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The majority
avoids [the question whether to overrule or narrow Hill] by declaring the Act content neutral
on other . . . grounds.”).
130. Id. at 2537–41 (majority opinion).
131. See id. at 2535–36.
132. Id. at 2537.
133. See id. at 2534 (“We . . . conclude that the Act is neither content nor viewpoint based
and therefore need not be analyzed under strict scrutiny.”).
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himself and two others, Justice Scalia would have overruled Hill.134 Notably,
Justice Scalia did not feel the need to marshal any special justification to
support the overruling. Rather, his reasons for overruling Hill “are set forth
in the dissents in that case.”135 By equating Hill’s worthiness of retention
with its soundness (or unsoundness) on the merits, Justice Scalia provided a
poignant illustration of the privileged place of expressive liberty as com-
pared to stare decisis.
Finally, notwithstanding its nominal retention of Hill, McCullen can be
read as implicitly—and significantly—revising Hill’s approach to content
neutrality in the context of abortion protesting and counseling. The McCul-
len majority explained that “offense or discomfort” on the part of people
entering abortion clinics “would not give the Commonwealth a content-
neutral justification to restrict” speech outside the clinics.136 That language
stands in contrast to Hill’s approval of laws aimed at “the harassment, the
nuisance, the persistent importuning, the following, the dogging, and the
implied threat of physical touching that can accompany an unwelcome ap-
proach.”137 McCullen thus appears to have redefined the interests that can
justify a governmental restriction—and, as a result, to have increased speech
protection beyond what was available after Hill.138 In this way, the Court
managed to expand expressive liberty even while avoiding a direct collision
with precedent.
3. Commercial Speech
Commercial speech occupies a unique place in First Amendment geog-
raphy.139 Although speech proposing commercial transactions falls within
the First Amendment’s ambit, it receives “lesser protection” than other
134. See id. at 2545 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In concluding that the stat-
ute is content based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, I necessarily conclude that Hill
should be overruled.”).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2532 (majority opinion); see also id. (“Whether or not a single person reacts to
abortion protestors’ chants or petitioners’ counseling, large crowds outside abortion clinics
can still compromise public safety, impede access, and obstruct sidewalks.”); Leslie Kendrick,
Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content Discrimination in McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev.
215, 226 (noting that the McCullen “majority, without mentioning Hill, rejected the claim that
the [relevant statute] had anything to do with shielding unwilling listeners. Instead it relied
solely upon patient safety and access”).
137. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000); see also Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimi-
nation Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231, 278 (2012) (describing Hill as a case in which “the gov-
ernment justified the restrictions partly by an interest in enabling potential patients to avoid
the unwanted messages of abortion protestors”).
138. See McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2546 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that
the majority “has sub silentio (and perhaps inadvertently) overruled Hill” because “[t]he una-
voidable implication of [its] holding is that protection against unwelcome speech cannot jus-
tify restrictions on the use of public streets and sidewalks”).
139. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The First Amendment and Related Statutes 257-59
(5th ed. 2014) (“ ‘Commercial speech’—more properly called commercial advertising—is less
protected than other kinds of speech[.]”).
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forms of expression.140 Rather than facing the extraordinary rigors of strict
scrutiny, restrictions on commercial speech are sustained if they satisfy the
so-called Central Hudson test: they must “directly advance[ ] a substantial
governmental interest” and be properly “drawn to achieve that interest.”141
The treatment of commercial speech has prompted extensive debate in
the academic literature142 and the Court’s case law.143 Justice Thomas has
taken a leading role in arguing for the application of strict scrutiny to regu-
lations limiting commercial speech.144 To him, there is no “philosophical or
historical basis” for singling out commercial speech for reduced protec-
tion.145 The pivotal issue going forward is how many other justices—present
and future—are willing to reconsider the doctrine of commercial speech.146
Regardless of what lies ahead, the Court’s commercial speech jurispru-
dence has already undergone a tonal shift. Without overruling its prior deci-
sions, the Court has increasingly characterized commercial speech as akin to
other speech in the protection it receives. The Court has achieved this result
“both by applying the governing . . . test more strictly and by classifying less
and less speech as commercial in the first place.”147
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. is an illuminating data point.148 In Sorrell, the
Court invalidated a Vermont law that restricted the sale of records revealing
how doctors prescribe drugs.149 Because the law could not satisfy even the
relatively lenient requirements for regulation of commercial speech, the
140. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–63
(1980).
141. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–68 (2011); see also Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 564; Volokh, supra note 139, at 258. Commercial speech may also be restricted if
it is false, deceptive, or “related to illegal activity.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64.
142. Compare C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 Ind. L.J.
981, 981 (2009) (“The world would do well not to follow the lead of the United States in its
view that commercial speech is an aspect of free speech.”), with Alex Kozinski & Stuart Ban-
ner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 628 (1990) (“It is the thesis of
this Article that the commercial/noncommercial distinction makes no sense.”).
143. E.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I . . . think that the
Court errs here in failing to recognize that the state law is most accurately viewed as an eco-
nomic regulation and that the speech involved (if it falls within the scope of the First Amend-
ment at all) occupies a significantly more subordinate position in the hierarchy of First
Amendment values than the Court gives it today.”).
144. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 518 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(describing as “per se illegitimate” the government’s “asserted interest . . . to keep legal users of
a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace”).
145. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
146. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 554 (noting that “several Members of the Court
have expressed doubts about the Central Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in par-
ticular cases”).
147. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 Duke L.J. 821, 887 (2008).
148. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
149. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
February 2017] Precedent and Speech 459
Court had no occasion to reconsider its commercial speech doctrine more
generally.150 Even so, the Court offered some words of concern. It denied the
authority of the government to pursue “policy objectives through the indi-
rect means of restraining certain speech by certain speakers” under the aus-
pices of commercial regulation.151 It also denied that the government’s desire
to protect consumers from their own unwise choices justifies commercial
speech regulations.152 By restricting the sale of prescriber information, Ver-
mont violated these tenets. The state had “engag[ed] in content-based dis-
crimination to advance its own side of a debate” and restricted speech
merely because it was “too persuasive.”153
It is natural to wonder whether Sorrell foretells a diminished power of
government to regulate commercial speech. The majority opinion suggests
that only the risk of deception or misunderstanding is sufficient to justify
restrictions on commercial speech, at least where the speech is directed at
“ ‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.”154 To be sure, this position
leaves open the possibility of retaining some differences between the treat-
ment of commercial speech and other speech. For example, the Court’s ac-
knowledgement that deceptiveness is a legitimate basis for restricting
commercial advertising might not extend in full measure to political speech,
where the value of robust expression is at its apex.155 There is also the possi-
bility that commercial speakers may be regulated in their appeals to mi-
nors,156 even if minors (and those who wish to address them) generally enjoy
substantial expressive liberty.157 Nevertheless, limiting regulation to these
types of situations would represent a departure from what the doctrine of
commercial speech once appeared to be.158 The effect could be especially
150. Id. at 2667 (“As in previous cases . . . the outcome is the same whether a special
commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied.”).
151. Id. at 2670.
152. Id. at 2670–71 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002)).
153. Id. at 2672.
154. Id. at 2671–72 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993)); see also Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I seriously doubt whether suppression of information
concerning the availability and price of a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for
the State to ‘dampen’ demand for or use of the product.”).
155. This is among the issues left open after Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct.
2334, 2338 (2014), which the Court decided on grounds of justiciability. Id. at 2347.
156. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (“[N]one of the peti-
tioners contests the importance of the State’s interest in preventing the use of tobacco prod-
ucts by minors.”).
157. Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2735–36 (2011) (“[M]inors are enti-
tled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in relatively narrow and
well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials
to them.” (alteration in original) (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
212–13 (1975))).
158. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562.
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pronounced to the extent that, as in Sorrell, laws are increasingly character-
ized as unlawful speech restrictions as opposed to benign economic regula-
tions with incidental effects on expression.159
4. Broadcast Indecency
In 1978, the Court ruled in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation that broadcasters
can be punished for disseminating indecent speech.160 The Court has faced
criticism for the reduced constitutional protection it extended to broadcast
media.161 The impact of its approach was amplified by the FCC’s decision
roughly a decade ago to treat even momentary, “fleeting” expletives as justi-
fying punishment.162
Challenges to the Pacifica regime have made their way to the Court
twice in recent years. Both times, the Court disposed of the case without
addressing Pacifica’s continued vitality.163 Notwithstanding the Court’s reti-
cence, Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg penned separate opinions re-
nouncing the Pacifica rule. Justice Ginsburg was brief in her remarks,
arguing that Pacifica was “wrong when it issued” and had become even
worse in light of factors including “technological advances.”164 Justice
Thomas offered greater elaboration along similar lines. He described Pacifica
159. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[The statute at issue] deprives
pharmaceutical and data-mining companies of data, collected pursuant to the government’s
regulatory mandate, that could help pharmaceutical companies create better sales messages. In
my view, this effect on expression is inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to
regulate a commercial enterprise.”).
160. 438 U.S. 726, 750–51 (1978); see also J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the
Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 Duke L.J. 1131, 1132–33 (1996) (noting that the con-
cept of indecency “includes sexually explicit speech that could not be regulated as obscene”
and is “a much larger category than many people imagine”).
161. E.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 325–27 (2d Cir. 2010) (criti-
cizing elements of the Pacifica rationale but concluding that “we are bound by Supreme Court
precedent, regardless of whether it reflects today’s realities”); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 465 (2d Cir. 2007) (following Pacifica but noting that “we would be remiss
not to observe that it is increasingly difficult to describe the broadcast media as uniquely
pervasive and uniquely accessible to children, and at some point in the future, strict scrutiny
may properly apply in the context of regulating broadcast television”).
162. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 505 (2009) (“This case concerns
the adequacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s explanation of its decision that
[federal law] sometimes forbids the broadcasting of indecent expletives even when the offen-
sive words are not repeated.”).
163. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (“In light of the
Court’s holding that the Commission’s policy failed to provide fair notice it is unnecessary to
reconsider Pacifica at this time.”); Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 529 (“We decline to
address the constitutional questions at this time.”).
164. Fox Television Stations, 132 S. Ct. at 2321 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
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and a predecessor case, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,165 as a “deep in-
trusion into the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.”166 He also empha-
sized technological advances as having undermined the notion of broadcast
media as “uniquely pervasive” and, thus, entitled to weakened constitutional
protection.167
Even if Pacifica’s factual premises had remained intact, its distinction
between broadcasting and other media—which is to say, between different
types of speakers—would be uneasy in a post–Citizens United world.168
Pacifica also raises vexing questions about why the effectiveness of a particu-
lar form of media furnishes added justification for restricting it.169 And the
fact that broadcasting is presently only one of many pervasive sources of
information exacerbates Pacifica’s vulnerability. The Court has stated that
factual changes provide a legitimate basis for reconsidering precedent,170 and
Pacifica seems to fit the bill.
Pacifica, though, has managed to survive. And there may be hope for the
decision in the years ahead. For example, the Pacifica rule could be recast as
an instantiation of “government speech” doctrine,171 whereby the govern-
ment has greater discretion to regulate the expressions of those to whom it
issues licenses.172 Alternatively, perhaps the Court will recognize an ongoing
need for a “safe harbor” where media consumers can steer clear of indecent
material.173 Whatever Pacifica’s eventual fate, the most salient point for now
165. 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) (“It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for the entire community, obli-
gated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great public concern.”).
166. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 530, 531 (Thomas, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 533 (quoting Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748); see also Christopher S. Yoo, Technologies
of Control and the Future of the First Amendment, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 747, 774 (2011)
(reiterating Justice Thomas’s observations and concluding that “[s]ignificant doubts exist as to
whether Pacifica remains good law even with respect to broadcasting”).
168. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (“Speech restrictions based on
the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.”).
169. Balkin, supra note 160, at 1136 (“[T]he fact that a mode of communication is partic-
ularly powerful or ubiquitous is not necessarily a reason for regulating it.”).
170. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (noting the
relevance of “whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”).
171. See Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. Rev.
695, 708 (2011) (“Government speech is not, strictly speaking, a First Amendment ‘right’ of
the government, but rather a doctrine that allows the government to justify what otherwise
might be unconstitutional interference with private speakers.” (footnote omitted)). But see Lili
Levi, “Smut and Nothing But”: The FCC, Indecency, and Regulatory Transformations in the
Shadows, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 509, 571 n.234 (2013) (“The Court has not found broadcast
licensees to be governmental actors, despite the discussion by some Justices in CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm.[,] 412 U.S. 94, 114–21 (1973).”).
172. Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012) (summarizing the
federal government’s argument that “when it licenses a conventional broadcast spectrum, the
public may assume that the Government has its own interest in setting certain standards”).
173. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 2307 (2012) (No. 10-1293).
462 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 115:439
is that despite its apparent vulnerability, it remains on the books. The Court
has not gone so far as to reaffirm Pacifica for reasons of stare decisis, but it
has allowed the case to survive.
The Court’s apparent reluctance to overrule Pacifica arguably reflects
some institutional dedication to doctrinal continuity.174 The case appears to
have served a “braking” function by encouraging a methodical approach to
legal change rather than an abrupt reversal-of-course.175 While it does not
follow that Pacifica will hang on indefinitely, the Court’s hesitance to over-
rule the case lends a degree of stability to the law by affecting the manner in
which constitutional doctrine evolves. At the same time, though the Court
has not overruled Pacifica, neither has it pledged fidelity to the case on stare
decisis grounds. Perhaps one day we will see an opinion expressly reaffirm-
ing Pacifica for the sake of continuity. Until such day arrives, the only cer-
tainty is that Pacifica has been granted a momentary reprieve.176
* * *
There are three important links between the cases discussed in this Sec-
tion. First, the Court has been willing to revise its First Amendment prece-
dents when it concludes they have gone astray. Second, the Court has
indicated that further revisions may lie ahead. Third, notably absent from
the Court’s discussions has been commitment to the idea that stare decisis
can compel the continued retention of a First Amendment precedent that is
flawed on the merits. The Court has sometimes avoided the need to address
the continued vitality of controversial precedents by deciding cases on other
grounds. But there has been no unequivocal demonstration that stare decisis
shields erroneous First Amendment precedents.
If stare decisis is marginalized, the constitutional protection of speech
will depend on the justices’ individual interpretive conclusions. With the
justices applying their own views about the best understanding of the law,
potential changes in the Court’s composition—which is to say, presidential
174. The desirability of allowing change to occur organically rather than through judicial
decree was one of the themes during the Court’s discussion of Pacifica in 2012. Consider this
statement of Justice Alito at oral argument: “It’s not going to be long before [broadcast televi-
sion] goes the way of vinyl records and eight-track tapes. . . . [W]hy not just let this die a
natural death? Why do you want us to intervene[?]” Id. at 33–34.
175. See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Prece-
dent, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1843, 1851–53 (2013) (discussing the braking function of precedent).
176. Two other recent First Amendment decisions warrant brief mention here. In Garcetti
v. Ceballos, the Court ruled that public employees do not receive constitutional protection
from employer discipline for statements made in the course of their official duties. 547 U.S.
410, 421 (2006). A year later, the Court ruled in Morse v. Frederick that students in public
schools do not receive constitutional protection for statements that promote the use of illegal
drugs without rising to the level of social commentary. 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). Both Garcetti
and Morse were described by dissenting justices as departures from the principles underlying
the Court’s preexisting case law. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 437–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 430–34 (Souter, J., dissenting). Whether or not those characterizations are
correct, the cases did not elevate stare decisis over principles of expressive liberty; in neither
case did the majority describe itself as bound, for reasons of stare decisis, to apply precedents
notwithstanding doubts about their soundness.
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elections and the judicial appointments they yield—will guide the path of
the law. That is not how the Court has described its role in the constitu-
tional order.
III. Expressive Liberty and Stare Decisis
The previous Part claimed that the Supreme Court has regularly ele-
vated expressive liberty over doctrinal continuity. That practice puts pres-
sure on the Court’s more general statements that deference to precedent is
the rule rather than the exception. In Part IV, I will argue that stare decisis
should retain an important role in shaping the freedom of speech. This does
not mean precedents are absolutely insulated from overruling. But it does
mean the value of deferring to precedent—and the ideal of the Court as an
enduring institution rather than a fluctuating assemblage of individuals—
warrants solicitude. Before reaching that discussion, this Part considers the
explanations for, and implications of, a weakened approach to stare decisis
in the First Amendment context.
A. Explanations
In considering the appropriate role of precedent in First Amendment
disputes, the initial task is explaining the current state of the law. One possi-
bility is that numerous portions of the Court’s free speech case law are es-
sentially unsettled. Some commentators have characterized the Court’s First
Amendment case law as lacking internal coherence, such that it “dances . . .
macabrely on the edge of complete doctrinal disintegration.”177 We can de-
tect similar, if less vivid, concerns in Justice Breyer’s caution against
“turn[ing] ‘free speech’ doctrine into a jurisprudence of labels” divorced
from effects and purposes.178 When doctrine seems sprawling or difficult to
synthesize, it can create an “unstable equilibrium” that is vulnerable to fur-
ther revision precisely because the instability has prevented firm expecta-
tions from taking hold.179
This explanation falters against the recognition that many of the Court’s
recent innovations have dealt with First Amendment rules that were quite
clear. It is not only the unsettled or murky aspects of the case law that have
been subject to revision. There was already substantial clarity surrounding
177. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1249, 1270
(1995); see also Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions 48 (2013) (arguing that
First Amendment doctrine can become mired in “incoherence and inconsistency” due to “the
fact that what purports to be a system of general legal rules and concepts is in fact a Swiss
cheese, a collection of partial rules and partial exceptions with plenty of holes in between”).
178. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer, J., concurring).
179. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 Harv.
L. Rev. 1055, 1105 (1997) (connecting, in the context of retroactivity, the justifiability of
protecting reliance interests with the question whether the law is in stable equilibrium).
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issues such as the worthlessness of false speech and the inability of corpora-
tions to make independent expenditures in support of political candidates.
The Court has now provided a different set of answers, but not a clearer set.
Alternatively, it may be that—as Chief Justice Burger once observed—
freedom of speech “is an area in which there are few eternal verities.”180
Perhaps the complex and ever-shifting nature of social and political expres-
sion has discouraged the Court from treating the law as truly settled. That
conclusion, however, contradicts the Court’s statements that expressive lib-
erty demands protections that are stable and unwavering.181 Without the
Court’s resolute commitment to durable principles of expressive liberty, it is
difficult to see how, for example, the freedom to resist governmental ortho-
doxy could maintain its position as a (and perhaps the) “fixed star in our
constitutional constellation.”182
There is also the possibility that at least some of the Court’s First
Amendment innovations are best understood as reflecting the age-old dis-
tinction between holding and dicta. On that account, the Court has not been
abandoning stare decisis, but rather applying it carefully and strictly. Return
to the example of United States v. Alvarez, which I discussed above.183 In
discarding the Court’s prior statements about the worthlessness of false
speech, the Alvarez plurality may be viewed as making an argument about
when deference is due: while the Court’s prior applications of the First
Amendment to particular types of false speech warrant deference, no such
deference is owed to its teachings that false speech lacks inherent worth.
Framed in this way, Alvarez does not represent a victory of expressive liberty
over judicial precedent. It is simply an affirmation of the principle that hold-
ings are entitled to deference while dicta are not.
This argument misses its mark. In resolving its prior cases the Court did
not strictly need to suggest a general rule denying the value of false speech.
But that is what the Court did.184 What is more, the Court frequently de-
scribes the binding scope of its precedents in capacious terms, encompassing
features such as doctrinal frameworks that sweep beyond the case at hand.185
While this practice has not been entirely consistent, it is sufficiently perva-
sive to cast doubt on any suggestion that the Court’s prior statements about
false speech were not entitled to presumptive deference under ordinary prin-
ciples of stare decisis.186
180. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judg-
ment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document
‘prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.’ ” (quoting Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)).
182. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 76–82.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 69–75.
185. Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 179, 193–96 (2014).
186. See id. at 190–97.
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Much the same is true of United States v. Stevens, which considered the
appropriate test for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment
protection.187 The Stevens Court did not directly address issues of stare deci-
sis. Instead, the Court treated its prior endorsements of cost-benefit analysis
as undeserving of deference. As in Alvarez, one way to understand the
Court’s approach is through the lens of the holding–dicta dichotomy. The
statements about cost-benefit analysis, the argument goes, were extraneous
dicta. As such, they were relevant only for their persuasive value. The prob-
lem with this account is the same one I discussed with respect to Alvarez
(which Stevens preceded by two years). The distinction between the applica-
tion of rules and the description of rationales is not a universal principle of
jurisprudence, even at the Supreme Court. To the contrary, the Court has
characterized its underlying rationales as entitled to stare decisis effect.188
And it often defines the binding scope of its precedents as sweeping well
beyond propositions that were strictly necessary.189 Nevertheless, the Stevens
Court disavowed its past statements about cost-benefit analysis.
The better explanation for the Court’s willingness to depart from First
Amendment precedent flows from the perceived significance of the rights at
issue. The Court has treated robust expression as more important than legal
stability. Holding all else constant, the greater the import one ascribes to
getting the law right, the greater the chances that one will decide to overrule
a dubious precedent. That correlation is crucial to understanding free speech
jurisprudence, because the Court has made unmistakable its view that pro-
tecting First Amendment liberties is of the utmost significance.
The link between the Court’s recent decisions on everything from cam-
paign finance to autobiographical dishonesty is an emphasis on the seem-
ingly incomparable value of free speech. It is that feature, I submit, that best
explains the weakness of First Amendment stare decisis. This conclusion
draws support from the Court’s rulings as well as its rhetoric. As notable as
the Court’s recent First Amendment decisions have been are the stark terms
in which the Court has described the dangers of adhering to its prior inter-
pretations. Recall the plurality opinion in Alvarez, where a law against con-
triving military honors raised concerns about the roving censorial power of
government.190 Recall, too, the Court’s opinion in Stevens, which depicted
the application of cost-benefit analysis as “startling and dangerous” in what
it portends for expressive liberty.191 Finally, recall Citizens United and its
linking of a restriction on corporate political expenditures with governmen-
tal efforts to “control thought.”192 The vision that emerges is fiercely protec-
tive of a wide array of expressions—true or false, offensive or innocuous,
personal or corporate—and deeply distrustful of governmental efforts at
187. See supra text accompanying notes 94–101.
188. Kozel, supra note 185, at 197.
189. See id. at 193–96.
190. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547–48 (2012) (plurality opinion).
191. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
192. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010).
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regulation. Understood in this way, judicial precedents that permit the re-
striction of expressive rights threaten enormous damage to the social and
political order.
In defending this position, the Court has looked primarily to First
Amendment theory.193 The justices have determined that the constitutional
guarantee of free speech is “most intelligible” when understood against a
backdrop of a substantial commitment to robust expression and a commen-
surate limitation of the government’s regulatory authority.194 That determi-
nation, of course, is contestable; future justices might well interpret the First
Amendment as evincing a different conceptual focus.195 But it captures the
existing state of the law, and it helps to explain why the Court often over-
rules or limits precedents that permit the restriction of speech.
When the costs inflicted by an erroneous decision are framed in such
dramatic terms, stare decisis has little role to play. We are not likely to see an
opinion that contains the line: “Though this precedent authorizes the gov-
ernment to control thought, we nevertheless uphold it on grounds of stare
decisis.” So long as the Court perceives all types of First Amendment restric-
tions as existential threats to liberty, the value of leaving matters settled will
forever find itself in (a distant) second place. The conventional doctrine of
stare decisis, which reflects a presumptive elevation of stability and con-
tinuity over substantive correctness, is turned on its head.196
B. Evaluation
It is understandable for the Court to treat the pursuit of certain values,
such as robust expression, as more important than others, such as legal sta-
bility. Prioritization is compatible with the doctrine of stare decisis, whose
flexibility reflects the recognition that competing interests may sometimes
support departures from precedent. Yet it is difficult to square the Court’s
readiness to overrule First Amendment precedents with its customary de-
mand for a “special justification” above and beyond a precedent’s wrongness
193. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1200 (1987) (explaining that such arguments “claim to
understand the Constitution as a whole, or a particular provision of it, by providing an ac-
count of the values, purposes, or political theory in light of which the Constitution or certain
elements of its language and structure are most intelligible”).
194. See id.
195. See id. at 1201–02 (“[T]he first amendment appears to some to create a general
marketplace of ideas. But others ascribe to the free speech guarantee the purpose, for the most
part, of protecting the value only of individual . . . self-expression. Still others view the object
as limited to preserving the freedom of political speech essential to a democracy.” (footnotes
omitted)).
196. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (“[T]he
Court could not pretend to be reexamining prior law with any justification beyond a present
doctrinal disposition to come out differently . . . . To overrule prior law for no other reason
than that would run counter to the view repeated in our cases, that a decision to overrule
should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was wrongly
decided.”).
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to warrant an overruling.197 Though “adhering to our prior case law” is the
Court’s stated “norm,”198 it has taken a different approach in speech cases.
The Court’s case law reveals a strong inclination toward rectifying con-
strained interpretations of expressive liberty. The result is to place precedent
on a precarious footing. If the importance of protecting speech invariably
outweighs the value of continuity, stare decisis falls away.
This is not to say precedent lacks any function at all. Among other
things, precedent can slow the pace of legal change by dissuading justices
from overruling past decisions when such overruling is unnecessary to reach
the correct result199—a phenomenon arguably on display in the Court’s re-
cent cases involving campaign contributions, labor unions, and broadcast
indecency.200 But stare decisis cannot play its most significant role by coun-
seling the retention of a flawed precedent unless the value of leaving things
settled sometimes trumps the value of deciding a case correctly in the eyes of
today’s Court.
The question is whether an unyielding focus on protecting speech, not-
withstanding any precedents to the contrary, is cause for celebration or con-
cern. There are serious arguments for privileging unfettered expression over
doctrinal continuity. The most important is also the most obvious: the re-
striction of expressive liberty can be damaging. It can be damaging to the
individual, who is prevented from speaking her mind as she sees fit.201 It can
be damaging to the speaker’s intended listeners, who are denied the benefit
of hearing and contemplating her positions.202 And it can be damaging to
the constitutional order, which depends on keeping governmental authority
at bay through a vigorous and open discourse.203 The situation is bad
197. E.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015); see also supra text
accompanying notes 29–30.
198. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.).
199. Kozel, supra note 185, at 1851–52.
200. See supra Part II.
201. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
Yale L.J. 877, 879 (1963) (“[E]xpression is an integral part of the development of ideas, of
mental exploration and of the affirmation of self. The power to realize his potentiality as a
human being begins at this point and must extend at least this far if the whole nature of man
is not to be thwarted.”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591,
593 (1982) (arguing that “the constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves” the
value of “individual self-realization,” which may refer to the “development of the individual’s
powers and abilities” or “the individual’s control of his or her own destiny through making
life-affecting decisions”).
202. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“[I]t is inherent in the
nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse
sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.”).
203. Id. at 340 (“Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment
stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints.”); Horwitz, supra note 177,
at 262 (“In many respects, distrust of government explains First Amendment doctrine better
than the other standard justifications of free speech.” (footnote omitted)); Richard A. Epstein,
Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 49 (1992) (“All too often
the desire of political figures to suppress speech has to be understood as a crude effort to
suppress criticism of public actors, which could lead to their deserved political embarrassment,
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enough when the Court fails to vindicate expressive liberties that the Consti-
tution rightfully protects. It is all the worse when the Court, having recog-
nized the error of its ways, compounds its mistake “in the interest of
stability.”204 There may be some areas of the law where it really is best to
leave matters settled. But the freedom of speech, the argument goes, is not
one of them.
Truncating expressive freedom can also take a toll on popular sover-
eignty. Viewed through the lens of democratic self-government, cramped
interpretations of constitutional liberties may be relatively benign under cer-
tain conditions. For example, if the Court construes a right too narrowly,
the people can respond by enacting statutory protections through ordinary
politics.205 The calculus may change when the right in question is the free-
dom of speech, whose restriction can undermine citizens’ ability to protect
themselves through the political process.206
The possibility thus arises that speech rights, or at least rights involving
political speech, should receive special protection “because they are critical
to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process.”207 John
Hart Ely famously described judicial review as a mechanism for “ensuring
broad participation in the processes and distributions of government.”208 As
applied to the treatment of precedent, this process-based approach suggests
that constrained interpretations of expressive liberty are among the most
troubling mistakes the Court can make. Those mistakes should be rectified
in the interest of “clearing the channels of political change.”209
removal from office, or electoral defeat. Thus the social good of free speech is found in the
fundamental check it exerts on how government officials behave.” (footnote omitted)); Elena
Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1996) (arguing that “First Amendment law, as devel-
oped by the Supreme Court over the past several decades, has as its primary, though unstated,
object the discovery of improper governmental motives”).
204. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 139 (1997) (“The whole function
of the doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must
nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.”).
205. See Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 Va.
L. Rev. 1437, 1443 (2007) (“Cases where the Court erroneously fails to intervene generally
allow the continued functioning of the political process and thus impose lower costs in terms
of popular sovereignty. . . . On the other hand, errors of intervention that involve issues of
immunity (constitutional rights) generally remove the subject from majoritarian action.”).
206. Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative The-
ory, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2189, 2211 (2014) (“[A] judicial error involving a failure to strike
down an act criminalizing speech critical of the national government is as problematic from a
popular sovereignty standpoint as is a judicial error that strikes down a law regulating the
number of hours bakers can work in a given week.”).
207. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 105
(1980).
208. Id. at 87.
209. Id. at 105; see also id. at 112 (“If the First Amendment is even to begin to serve its
central function of assuring an open political dialogue and process, we must seek to minimize
assessment of the dangerousness of the various messages people want to communicate.”).
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Another potential explanation for the Court’s readiness to reconsider
First Amendment precedent involves the flexible nature of stare decisis. The
Court invariably describes stare decisis as a “principle of policy” rather than
an “inexorable command.”210 While deference to precedent is a weighty con-
sideration, society should not have to endure the Court’s most grievous con-
stitutional mistakes without hope of remedy.211 Unblinking fidelity to
judicial errors could undermine the rule-of-law benefits that the doctrine of
stare decisis is meant to foster, both by “stifling the practical effectiveness of
reasoned argumentation” and by entrenching departures from the Court’s
best reading of the Constitution.212 The flexibility of stare decisis, one might
conclude, makes the frequent reconsideration of First Amendment prece-
dents unremarkable and unobjectionable.
There is no denying the importance of free speech. Yet the justifications
animating the doctrine of stare decisis do not lose all their force in the First
Amendment context. Departures from precedent can be disruptive, regard-
less of whether they enhance expressive liberty. Citizens United is a case in
point.213 Despite acknowledging that its prior decisions had influenced gov-
ernmental efforts to regulate campaign finance, the Court stated that legisla-
tive reliance “is not a compelling interest for stare decisis.”214 This conclusion
is perplexing if one takes a comprehensive and systemic view of legal disrup-
tion—a view the Court has endorsed on other occasions.215
Citizens United makes more sense as a product of the Court’s abiding
regard for expressive liberty and its corresponding distrust of speech restric-
tions. In light of the perceived harms of denying First Amendment rights to
corporate and union speakers, there was little point in poring over the dis-
ruptive effects that would accompany the overruling of settled law. Such
210. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S.
106, 119 (1940)).
211. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(noting that if stare decisis were an absolute command, “segregation would be legal, minimum
wage laws would be unconstitutional, and the Government could wiretap ordinary criminal
suspects without first obtaining warrants”).
212. Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 Mich. L. Rev. First
Impressions 37, 40 (2013), http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol111/iss1/ [https://perma
.cc/T886-VCAP]; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 144 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It damages the coherence of the law if we cling to outworn prece-
dent at odds with later, more enlightened decisions.”).
213. Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
214. Id. at 365.
215. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567–68 (2002) (plurality opinion)
(“Legislatures and their constituents have relied upon [the relevant precedent] to exercise con-
trol over sentencing through dozens of statutes like the one the Court approved in that
case. . . . We see no reason to overturn those statutes or cast uncertainty upon the sentences
imposed under them.”); see also, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 925 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing reliance by parties including Congress and
the Executive Branch); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.)
(“Buckley has promoted considerable reliance. Congress and state legislatures have used Buck-
ley when drafting campaign finance laws.”).
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effects could never tip the balance toward preserving the status quo—which
is to say, they could never be “compelling.”216 Yet the Court’s solicitude for
unfettered expression does not change the fact that its opinion disrupted the
regulatory backdrop. Nor does it change the fact that campaign finance ju-
risprudence looks the way it does today because a particular understanding
of the First Amendment commanded the allegiance of five sitting justices
while a competing understanding fell one justice short.
This latter point is important, because stare decisis does more than pro-
tect expectations. It also promotes judicial impersonality by allowing legal
rules to retain their content as judges come and go.217 Impersonality is valu-
able in the First Amendment context as in all others. As Justice Frankfurter
once observed, the role of the judge is to “take a view of longer range than
the period of responsibility entrusted to Congress and legislatures.”218 With-
out such a perspective on the part of the judiciary, “that which was deemed
to be of so fundamental a nature as to be written into the Constitution to
endure for all times” may become “the sport of shifting winds of
doctrine.”219
A focus on continuity dovetails with a commitment to judicial decision-
making grounded “in the law rather than in the proclivities of individu-
als.”220 To defer to precedent is to recognize the value of subordinating
personal judgments to the general, publicly accessible principles established
by a tribunal with its own identity, history, and practices. The individual
becomes less important than the institution. And the individual’s conclu-
sions, wise though they may be, are tempered by the judgments of those
who came before.
The ideal of judicial impersonality stands in tension with unconstrained
(or weakly constrained) overruling, irrespective of whether the case being
overruled deals with expressive liberty. Absent a meaningful doctrine of
stare decisis, determining whether to overrule a case requires asking whether
there are five justices who disagree with it. In turn, if the Court votes to
overrule, the longevity of its new approach depends on whether the four
dissenters can add, through the process of presidential appointment, another
216. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365.
217. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very con-
cept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time
that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
265–66 (1986) (“[The doctrine of stare decisis] permits society to presume that bedrock prin-
ciples are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contrib-
utes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in
fact.”).
218. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 665 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 265.
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like-minded justice to their ranks.221 When decisions ebb and flow in this
way, it becomes more difficult to characterize them as the judgments of a
unified Court acting in a collaborative manner across time.222 Instead, the
decisions appear to track the Court’s balance of power. To be sure, a legal
system can remain compatible with the rule of law and still leave room for
departures from precedent.223 But there must be some mechanism for main-
taining stability and continuity as the composition of the bench changes.224
This requirement is all the more resonant in First Amendment cases due
to the prominence of expressive liberty in legal and political culture.225 A
vacillating body of First Amendment case law may not disrupt economic
rights as much as a vacillating body of contract law or property law. But
given widespread interest in the ground rules of expressive freedom, fluctua-
tions can contribute to the perception that constitutional doctrine is driven
more by personality rather than principle.226 Stare decisis promotes “a con-
ception of a court continuing over time.”227 Take away that conception, and
what remains are individual judgments by individual judges.228
221. There is also the possibility that a sitting justice will have a change of heart, though
that prospect seems unlikely—at least in the near term—with respect to a case like Citizens
United, which the justices debated fervently and in considerable detail. See 558 U.S. 310.
222. Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems
in the Making and Application of Law 569 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (noting the argument that stare decisis promotes “[t]he desirability, from the point
of view of fairness to the litigants, of securing a reasonable uniformity of decision throughout
the judicial system, both at any given time and from one time to another”).
223. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651, 683
(1995) (“While stare decisis does not preclude the occasional overruling of cases, the fact that a
court’s personnel have changed and the new judges have a different view of the law from that
of their predecessors is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for overruling . . . .”).
224. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 244 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (“[T]he rule of
law demands that adhering to our prior case law be the norm. Departure from precedent is
exceptional, and requires ‘special justification.’ ” (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,
212 (1984))); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 26 (2012) (“[I]n no context does the rule of law dictate immutability. But the
rule of law does counsel against too-frequent changes in the law, and this applies as much to
precedent as to other sources of law.”).
225. See Amar, supra note 11, at 1028–29 (“Ordinary citizens of all persuasions and of all
regions fiercely claim expressive and religious rights and embody them in their daily
practices.”).
226. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 408 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that if the principle of stare decisis “is to do any mean-
ingful work in supporting the rule of law, it must at least demand a significant justification,
beyond the preferences of five Justices, for overturning settled doctrine”); Hart & Sacks,
supra note 222, at 569 (including among the justifications for stare decisis “[t]he desirability of
promoting genuine impersonality of decision by minimizing the elements of personal discre-
tion, and of facilitating the operation of the check of professional criticism”).
227. Dorf, supra note 223, at 683.
228. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Con-
stitutional Doctrine, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 67, 70 (1988) (arguing that fidelity to prece-
dent “moderates ideological swings and thus preserves both the appearance and the reality of
the Court as a legal rather than a purely political institution”); cf. Waldron, supra note 224, at
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It is also important to bear in mind that the current, speech-protective
state of First Amendment doctrine is not the only possible equilibrium.
Without a presumption of deference to precedent, the case law could swing
between periods of robust and meager protection. Of course, it is possible to
imagine an asymmetrical rule whereby speech-restrictive precedents receive
no deference while speech-protective precedents receive substantial defer-
ence, even if they are deemed incorrect. But it is not clear that such a rule
would be desirable, as it would be biased toward the entrenchment of speech
rights at the expense of countervailing values like privacy, reputational dig-
nity, and public safety.
Even justices who agree that expressive liberty warrants elevated status
may have different opinions about the best means of protection. Citizens
United provides a vivid illustration. On some accounts, the vision of public
discourse Citizens United adopts is unduly cramped. While the majority de-
scribed its decision as restoring “ ‘civic discourse . . . to the people,’”229 the
dissenters countered that Austin embodied “a concern to facilitate First
Amendment values by preserving some breathing room around the electoral
‘marketplace’ of ideas.”230 Whichever side had the better of the argument,
the split among justices was not between those who favored more discourse
and those who favored less. The disagreement involved the best way to pro-
mote effective discourse in a democratic society.231
Stare decisis is a means of injecting consistency and continuity into
these debates. Without a meaningful doctrine of stare decisis, each justice is
left to rely on her individual philosophy and “private sentiments” in inter-
preting the First Amendment.232 That raises the risk of “arbitrary discretion”
that led Alexander Hamilton to emphasize the importance of precedent in
his classic defense of the proposed Constitution.233
IV. Harmonizing Speech and Precedent
I have argued that the doctrine of stare decisis should remain important
even when expressive liberty is at stake. That position coheres with the Su-
preme Court’s repeated descriptions of stare decisis as promoting funda-
mental values of stability and continuity. But I have also argued that the
21 (explaining that a subsequent judge “should think of himself not as an individual charged
with deciding cases but as a member of a court”).
229. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 341 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with respect to BCRA Titles
I and II), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310).
230. Id. at 473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 475
(“The Court’s blinkered and aphoristic approach to the First Amendment may well promote
corporate power at the cost of the individual and collective self-expression the Amendment
was meant to serve.”).
231. See supra Section II.A.
232. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (photo. re-
print 2002) (1765).
233. The Federalist No. 78, at 298 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2005).
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Court’s engagements with free speech evince a readiness to elevate expres-
sive freedom over any benefits of fidelity to precedent.
This Part examines ways to address the resulting tension. The first pro-
posal calls for reorienting and reinvigorating the doctrine of stare decisis to
make it less dependent on matters of interpretive philosophy that differ from
judge to judge and justice to justice. The second proposal emphasizes two
principles—which I describe respectively as concreteness and content sensi-
tivity—for preventing the Court’s admirable dedication to expressive liberty
from overwhelming legal continuity every time the two values conflict.
A. Free Speech and Second-Best Stare Decisis
The Court’s current approach to its First Amendment precedents de-
pends on the justices’ interpretive philosophies and normative commit-
ments. For example, devotion to popular sovereignty could explain the
protection of political speech at the expense of precedent in cases like Citi-
zens United.234 But it raises questions about why the Court is willing to break
with the past even when the implications for popular sovereignty are diluted
or attenuated—as with the protection of false biographical statements in
United States v. Alvarez.235 Alternatively, if the justices are primarily moti-
vated by the importance of individual self-actualization, we might wonder
why the Citizens United majority was willing to overrule precedents on cor-
porate electioneering notwithstanding the resulting disruption of reliance
interests. And a focus on distrust of governmental authority might explain
the Court’s references to censorship and thought control, but it would leave
open the argument that different speech regulations create different degrees
of concern about overreaching and potential for abuse.
In reality, the case law does not furnish a comprehensive account of why
it is imperative to protect speech even at the cost of disrupting settled law.
Instead, the Court’s opinions reflect the idea that speech is valuable for mul-
tiple reasons, all of which appear to be more important than continuity. Yet
that position is too abstract to be fully satisfying. Given the justices’ high
praise for the role of stare decisis—exemplified in recent descriptions of the
doctrine as “a foundation stone of the rule of law”236 that “is vital to the
proper exercise of the judicial function”237—it is difficult to see why speech
should so easily trump precedent as a matter of course. It might well be that
some First Amendment precedents cannot be tolerated given their failure to
protect valuable speech. That result is compatible with the well-established
notion of stare decisis as presumptive rather than absolute.238 But if an over-
ruling is warranted in every case involving restrictions on speech, either the
234. See supra text accompanying notes 38–54.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 76–82.
236. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014).
237. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 377 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
238. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
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value of some speech is being overstated or the value of stare decisis is mea-
ger indeed.
Theoretically, the justices could respond by agreeing on a particular the-
ory of constitutional interpretation and a corresponding account of why it is
important to overrule flawed precedents. For instance, they might conclude
that the First Amendment is uniquely offended by limitations on political
expression. Under this approach, precedents permitting restrictions on elec-
tion-related speech would be viewed with skepticism, while precedents deal-
ing with nonpolitical speech might be tolerable even if today’s justices would
have decided them differently in the first instance.239 Alternatively, the jus-
tices might conclude the First Amendment is fundamentally concerned with
giving each citizen a meaningful opportunity to be heard, in which case the
most problematic precedents would be those that allow the domination of
some voices over others.240 Whichever way the justices resolved the issue,
they would produce a uniform metric for gauging the harmfulness of a mis-
taken precedent. In applying the stare decisis analysis, they would consider
that harmfulness alongside other factors such as the importance of promot-
ing judicial impersonality and protecting settled expectations.241
But ours is not a world of abiding interpretive agreement. It is a world
of interpretive pluralism, in which different justices have (very) different be-
liefs about the proper ends and means of constitutional interpretation. What
some justices view as a harmful consequence of precedent—say, the fact that
it prevents the government from seeking to level the playing field among
different speakers—might be viewed by others as irrelevant, benign, or even
praiseworthy.242 This feature is by no means unique to the First Amend-
ment. It occurs throughout constitutional law, and in the statutory and
common law domains as well.243 When different justices have different views
about how the law should be interpreted, they will likewise have different
views about which features of a precedent are relevant to its retention or
overruling.
239. Cf. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826
(2011) (“The First Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to [cam-
paign-related] speech, the guiding principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered interchange of
ideas’—not whatever the State may view as fair.” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14
(1976) (per curiam))).
240. See id. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment’s core purpose is to
foster a healthy, vibrant political system full of robust discussion and debate.”).
241. See supra Part I.
242. Compare Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC, 131 S. Ct. at 2825 (“We have
repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state interest in ‘level-
ing the playing field’ that can justify undue burdens on political speech.”), with id. at 2830
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the relevant legislation “promotes the values underlying
both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing the ‘opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people’ ”
(quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964))).
243. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 Calif. L. Rev. 1139,
1145–55 (2015).
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But one of the most important roles of stare decisis is serving as a bridge
between jurists who hold competing interpretive philosophies.244 Fidelity to
precedent helps establish the Court as an institution that is something more
than the sum of its ever-changing parts. That is what the justices mean when
they describe stare decisis as integral to the rule of law.245
The current situation, then, is one in which the very phenomenon of
interpretive pluralism that heightens the need for stare decisis interferes with
the consistent treatment of precedent. To be effective, the doctrine of stare
decisis needs to evolve in a way that can emphasize areas of agreement and
minimize considerations that are bound up with contested issues of inter-
pretive methodology. In particular, the doctrine would benefit if the justices
focused on factors such as a precedent’s procedural workability, factual ac-
curacy, and reliance implications while generally avoiding inquiries into the
perceived harmfulness of a precedent’s substantive effects.246
We can think of this approach in terms of second-best stare decisis. Sec-
ond-best stare decisis builds from the idea that the doctrine of precedent
ought to be designed in light of our second-best world of interpretive plural-
ism instead of assuming an idealized world of interpretive consensus. The
theory of second-best posits that when a system suffers from one flaw—such
that the ideal state of affairs is unattainable—the best option might be to
introduce another flaw that responds to the first. As Adrian Vermeule has
explained:
Suppose that at least some of the conditions necessary to produce a given
ideal or first-best constitutional order fail to hold. Even if it would be best
to achieve full satisfaction of all those conditions, it does not follow that it
is best to achieve as many as possible of the conditions, taken one by one.
Rather, multiple failures of the ideal can offset one [another], producing a
closer approximation to the ideal at the level of the overall system.247
In other words, sometimes the wisest course in the face of one imperfection
is to introduce another.
These principles apply to the treatment of precedent. The basic rationale
of second-best stare decisis is that while inquiries into procedural workabil-
ity, factual accuracy, and reliance will undoubtedly lead to disagreements
from time to time, those disagreements are not bound up with interpretive
philosophy and methodological preferences. A justice can determine
whether a precedent rests on a factual error or produces procedural snags
regardless of how that justice views the purpose of the First Amendment or
the proper method of interpreting the Constitution.
244. See supra Section III.B; see also Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential
Disagreement, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1711, 1737 (2013) (“Rather than extinguishing disagreement,
constitutional stare decisis moderates it. The doctrine enables a reasoned conversation over
time between justices—and others—who subscribe to competing methodologies of constitu-
tional interpretation.”).
245. Kozel, supra note 243, at 1159.
246. See id. at 1176–77.
247. Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution 10 (2011).
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By contrast, evaluating a precedent’s substantive effects requires consult-
ing an underlying theory of interpretation. Some interpretive theories prize
popular sovereignty, others individual liberty, and still others the practical
weighing of costs and benefits.248 Which of these considerations wins out
depends on a threshold determination of which interpretive theory applies.
It is natural that if the justices disagree about these underlying matters of
interpretive philosophy, they will also disagree about whether a given prece-
dent is so pernicious as to justify its overruling. As a corollary, stare decisis
loses much of its ability to transform the work of individual jurists into the
work of an enduring court.
Second-best stare decisis avoids this result. It excludes judicial percep-
tions of a precedent’s substantive impact in all but the most exceptional
cases.249 As applied to the First Amendment context, second-best stare deci-
sis would reaffirm the presumption that precedents are to be followed unless
they rest on a mistaken factual premise or have yielded a procedurally un-
workable set of rules.250 For example, the fact that broadcast media is no
longer uniquely pervasive in American society would be an appropriate rea-
son to reconsider the Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.251
Whatever one’s philosophy of constitutional adjudication, the changes to the
media market over the past four decades are undeniable.
On the other hand, there was no factual mistake in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, which was overruled in Citizens United.252 Nor was
the Austin rule mired in procedural unworkability. As a result, second-best
stare decisis would have counseled the retention of Austin even if a majority
of justices believed it was wrong on the merits. The only exception would be
if those justices could explain why Austin (or any other precedent) was not
simply wrong, but had created substantive effects that were so extraordinary
as to be intolerable based on the specific interpretive theory applied. This
exception tracks the Court’s consistent depiction of stare decisis as funda-
mental but non-absolute.253 It allows a justice to invoke her own judicial
philosophy in the cases she views as the worst of the worst, even if that
means elevating her individual convictions over the Court’s institutional
identity.254 The justice who prizes popular sovereignty need not tolerate a
precedent she thinks is a devastating affront to that value. The justice who
views the freedom of speech through a lens of government distrust may vote
to overrule a precedent permitting heavy-handed impositions of prescribed
orthodoxy. And the list goes on. Justices will disagree about which effects are
constitutionally relevant (as opposed to regrettable but legally immaterial).
248. See Kozel, supra note 243, at 1146–50.
249. Id. at 1177.
250. See supra Part I.
251. See supra Section II.E.4.
252. See supra Section II.A.
253. See supra Part I.
254. Kozel, supra note 243, at 1173–76.
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Whichever theory a given justice adopts, second-best stare decisis allows her
to depart from precedents that are not just suboptimal, but disastrous.
At the same time, the exception’s extraordinary nature reinforces the
fact that in the usual course, such considerations are irrelevant to the stare
decisis calculus. Absent some reason for overruling that appeals to justices
across the methodological spectrum, precedents—including precedents in-
volving the freedom of speech—must ordinarily be respected.
This second-best reorientation of stare decisis would lend stability and
continuity to the case law, bringing the doctrine in line with the Court’s
repeated statements about the virtues of fidelity to settled law. It would also
enable the justices to explain exactly why flawed First Amendment prece-
dents are bad, leading to a better understanding of the theories and factors
that shape the Court’s protection of the freedom of speech. The most salient
cost of this approach would be the preservation of some precedents that a
majority of sitting justices view as flawed. But given the Court’s repeated
statements about the crucial role of precedent in constitutional law, this re-
sult is unavoidable if we are to have a doctrine of stare decisis that delivers
on its promises.
B. Reinvigorating the Existing Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Even without a second-best reorientation of stare decisis that limits the
role of a prior decision’s substantive effects, the Court’s existing case law
provides a workable framework for increased fidelity to precedent. The key
is putting the Court’s articulated principles of deference into practice. To
abide by an imperfect precedent is to promote a vision of law as something
more than the proclivities of those who come and go from the bench. The
converse is also true. Even if one believes freedom of speech is profoundly
important, allowing speech to trump stare decisis as a matter of course
threatens to undermine the impersonality of constitutional law.
I have described several recent cases in which the Court adopted an
expansive view of expressive liberty despite the existence of contrary prece-
dent. But as I noted above, there is no guarantee future justices will adhere
to a similar view of the value of free speech. That creates the potential for
vacillation in the resolution of First Amendment disputes and the articula-
tion of the rules of free speech. The doctrine of stare decisis is a means of
moderating such swings.255 The justice who is fiercely protective of speech
must sometimes abide by precedent even in cases she would have resolved
differently as an initial matter. The justice who is more accepting of speech
regulations must sometimes do the same. Through this process of prece-
dent-based compromise, the justices preserve the essential stability and im-
personality of the constitutional framework.
255. See Barrett, supra note 244, at 1722 (“In hot-button cases where differences in consti-
tutional philosophy are in the foreground, the preference for continuity disciplines jurispru-
dential disagreement.”).
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Agreement among the justices must extend beyond the platitude that
fidelity to precedent is a beneficial aspiration. For the doctrine of stare deci-
sis to have meaningful effect, there must be shared dedication not only to
the general process of weighing the costs and benefits of deviating from pre-
cedent, but also to the idea that the virtues of stability and impersonality
should sometimes achieve the outcome of allowing precedent to carry the
day.
The Court has taken numerous stands for the protection of First
Amendment liberty. If the Court wishes to preserve the vitality of stare deci-
sis and the virtues of continuity in the context of free speech, it occasionally
must interrupt that trend to issue a reminder that stare decisis is something
more than rhetoric to be recited and overborne. Prior decisions would still
be subject to reconsideration; an absolute doctrine of stare decisis has no
currency at the Court.256 But if an argument from stare decisis is not an
automatic winner, neither should it be an automatic loser. The Court’s past
decisions must occasionally win out precisely because they are the Court’s
past decisions, and despite the fact that they may be less (or, for that matter,
more) protective of speech than today’s justices would prefer. The invoca-
tion of stare decisis en route to a surefire overruling is deference in name
alone.
Two principles are instrumental in accommodating the robust protec-
tion of expressive liberty within a system that preserves a meaningful role for
precedent. Those principles, which we can think of as concreteness and con-
tent sensitivity, are related but distinct. Concreteness entails a targeted in-
quiry into the benefits that would arise, or the harms that would be avoided,
by overruling a speech-restrictive precedent. Content sensitivity means that
in making such an inquiry, the Court should be willing to acknowledge that
different categories of speech have different ramifications. Even if the stan-
dard account of First Amendment jurisprudence is resistant—though, as I
will explain, not entirely resistant—to distinguishing among categories of
expression based on their content and consequences, the doctrine of stare
decisis may take a different path.
1. Concreteness
I have suggested that we can explain the Court’s departures from First
Amendment precedent by recognizing its tendency to emphasize the harms
flowing from restrictions on speech. Failing to protect false biographical
statements raises concerns about roving ministries of truth. Regulating
speech because its costs outweigh its benefits creates startling dangers of
governmental oppression. Limiting a corporation’s right to engage in politi-
cal advocacy enables the government to control thought. And so on.257
256. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(“[N]one of us has viewed stare decisis in such absolute terms.”).
257. See supra Section IV.A.
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In theory, the other side of the scale includes the value of stare decisis.
But stability, continuity, and impersonality are no match for thought con-
trol and ministries of truth. Describing all First Amendment harms in such
dramatic terms eliminates any prospect of a meaningful doctrine of stare
decisis.
Assuming that the Court wishes to preserve a role for precedent in the
First Amendment context, it would be well served to begin by describing the
relevant constitutional harms in a more targeted and concrete fashion. For
example, in a case like Alvarez, the harm that stems from allowing the re-
striction of false statements should be aligned with the type of speech at
issue: namely, falsified details about one’s own life.258 The question would be
whether retaining a line of decisions that impedes one’s ability to make false
biographical statements is so problematic as to justify a departure from pre-
cedent. The relevant considerations might include the value of protecting
such falsity, perhaps on grounds that making inaccurate biographical state-
ments is a component of “human self-expression.”259 But more generalized
anxieties about governmental censorship would become relevant only if
there were a direct connection between those worries and the case at hand.
Absent a direct connection, abstract principles of governmental distrust
would have no role in the stare decisis calculus. Those principles might in-
form the threshold question of how the First Amendment ought to be inter-
preted, but they would be cordoned off from the distinct question of
whether implementing the correct constitutional rule justifies the costs of
deviating from precedent.
For another illustration of the concreteness principle, consider Citizens
United and its protection of corporate campaign expenditures. Concreteness
requires venturing beyond the argument that “[w]hen Government seeks to
use its full power . . . to command where a person may get his or her infor-
mation . . . it uses censorship to control thought.”260 That argument, even if
valid on its own terms, is too abstract to inform the inquiry into how harm-
ful it would be to retain a precedent that allows the restriction of corporate
electioneering. For stare decisis purposes, the more pertinent question is
how pre-Citizens United case law was affecting public debate about candi-
dates for political office. This is a demanding inquiry, to be sure. But if a
precedent’s ill effects are to be treated as relevant, a targeted inquiry is more
illuminating than generalized anxieties.
A third illustration comes from the Court’s recent discussions of labor
unions in the public sector. Some justices have suggested that requiring pub-
lic employees to fund a labor union’s collective bargaining activities may
amount to a First Amendment violation.261 Should a majority of justices
adopt this view, they would need to confront the further question of
258. See 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–45 (2012) (plurality opinion).
259. United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing en banc).
260. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 356.
261. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2631–34 (2014).
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whether the consequences of the violation are so problematic as to warrant
the overruling of precedent. Does the authorization of compulsory fees re-
present a significant interference with employees’ expressive liberty, or is the
effect more marginal? Is it relevant that employees have alternative avenues
for expressing themselves? By making targeted inquiries like these, the Court
would replace an abstract commitment to the value of expressive liberty
with a more nuanced investigation of the interplay between the value of
speech and the value of continuity.
2. Content Sensitivity
Despite the Court’s general wariness of content-based restrictions,262 it
is common for the Court to take content into account in determining the
level of protection speech is due. Part II discussed the exceptions to constitu-
tional protection for categories of speech such as defamation, fighting
words, and incitement. These exceptions remain overtly content-based, not-
withstanding the Court’s recent emphasis on linking them with historical
practice.263
Much the same is true of the Court’s protection of discourse on issues
of public concern. Speech on matters of public concern receives added insu-
lation in contexts such as defamation,264 employer retaliation,265 and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.266 The rationale, the Court has
explained, is that speech related to issues of public concern is “at the heart of
the First Amendment’s protection.”267
Along similar lines, the Court’s definition of obscenity continues to de-
pend on whether speech has “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”268 That definition provides another link between constitutional pro-
tection and value judgments. Indeed, the justices have noted that even when
sexually explicit depictions possess “arguably artistic value” that triggers
constitutional protection, “few of us would march our sons and daughters
262. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (recognizing the “guiding
First Amendment principle that the ‘government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content’ ” (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972))).
263. See supra Part II.
264. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)
(plurality opinion) (“In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no mat-
ters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed
and punitive damages—even absent a showing of ‘actual malice.’ ” (footnote omitted)).
265. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (noting that if a public employee’s
speech “cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it
is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge” (footnote omitted)).
266. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 (2011) (“Whether the First Amendment pro-
hibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is
of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.”).
267. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
268. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
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off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see” them.269 The point is plain:
some types of speech are more valuable, both doctrinally and practically,
than others.
From time to time, justices have suggested that political speech exists on
a special plane due to its importance in democratic society. Justice Scalia
once stated that “[i]t is perhaps our most important constitutional task to
ensure freedom of political speech.”270 Likewise, Justice Kennedy has argued
that the Court’s rulings “must never be viewed with more caution than
when they provide immunity from their own correction in the political pro-
cess and in the forum of unrestrained speech.”271 The underlying theory is
that limitations on political speech are uniquely self-insulating because they
stifle efforts to generate democratic opposition. In light of that concern, the
Court’s “obligation to examine the operation of the law is all the more ur-
gent when the new evil is itself a distortion of speech.”272 The Court recently
underscored these sentiments in Knox v. Service Employees International
Union, Local 1000 by noting “the close connection between our Nation’s
commitment to self-government and the rights protected by the First
Amendment.”273 McCutcheon v. FEC likewise declared that “[t]here is no
right more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in electing
our political leaders.”274 After all, as Professor Amar has noted, the Constitu-
tion itself “came to life through and because of uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open political speech.”275
The law of precedent should recognize distinctions such as these. The
importance of striking a flawed decision from the books informs the appli-
cation of stare decisis under existing law. The Court should embrace the
principle of content sensitivity by acknowledging that different speech-re-
strictive precedents may create different levels of harm. In other words, cer-
tain precedents should be more vulnerable to overruling precisely because
269. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opinion).
270. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 503 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
271. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 407 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 408.
273. 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012).
274. 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1440–41 (2014) (plurality opinion). Several state courts have offered
similar readings of the Supreme Court’s case law. E.g., Fine v. Bernstein, 726 N.W.2d 137, 144
(Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (“[P]olitical speech receives greater protection under the First Amend-
ment . . . .”); Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1997) (“Political speech is a special type of expression which is afforded the greatest protection
under the First Amendment . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d
1046, 1050 (Wash. 1993) (“Wherever the extreme perimeters of protected speech may lie, it is
clear the First Amendment protects political speech, . . . giving it greater protection over other
forms of speech.” (citation omitted)).
275. Amar, supra note 11, at 1028; see also id. at 1027 (“The Constitution’s entire struc-
ture presupposes free elections, but elections cannot truly be free if incumbents are able to
silence challengers.”).
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they are worse in terms of the substantive outcomes they produce.276 This is
true regardless of the interpretive philosophy a particular justice applies. Not
every speech restriction implicates popular sovereignty in the same way.
Neither does every restriction have identical ramifications for self-actualiza-
tion or for the operation of the marketplace of ideas. The value of getting
the law right is too complex to define in the abstract.
I argued in the previous Part that in all but the most exceptional cases,
the best approach is to disregard a precedent’s substantive effects in deciding
whether to overrule it.277 If, however, the Court is committed to preserving
the relevance of substantive effects, it would be well served to acknowledge
that the consequences of speech vary depending on the type of expression at
issue.
To illustrate, return to the issue of political speech. The Court has left
no doubt about its view that restrictions on political speech can pose serious
threats to American democracy. The implication is that, all else equal, prece-
dents that stifle political speech will lead to substantial harms.278 Content
sensitivity prevents that same analysis from extending to every precedent
that upholds a speech restriction. Consider the example of false statements
about one’s personal history, as discussed in Alvarez. The Alvarez plurality
characterized restrictions on biographical fabrications as immensely harm-
ful, opening the door to “an endless list of subjects the National Govern-
ment or the States could single out” and repress.279 That analysis falls short
of content sensitivity. The plurality did not explain how prohibiting false-
hoods about one’s military record, or even about one’s life more broadly,
translates into significant substantive harm. Content sensitivity suggests the
plurality should have provided such an explanation to justify deviating from
its prior statements about false speech.
The same principle applies to other First Amendment precedents. The
harms flowing from compelled subsidization of labor unions may be differ-
ent from the harms arising from limiting the rights of political protestors.280
Similarly, prohibitions on broadcast indecency are likely to have different
effects than limitations on campaign contributions.281 In determining
whether a flawed precedent should be overruled, embracing these distinc-
tions is vital. Only by recognizing differences among types of speech can the
276. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 89, at 104 (noting that “speech varies in the magnitude of the
social benefit it occasions: as the Court put it, some utterances are of low social value in their
contribution to the discovery of truth or the development of public policy.”).
277. See supra Section IV.A.
278. Of course, whether a restriction truly stifles speech—as opposed to regulating certain
speech as a means to making the broader marketplace of ideas more robust—will sometimes
be in dispute.
279. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (plurality opinion).
280. Compare Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012), with
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
281. Compare FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), with McCutcheon v. FEC, 134
S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
February 2017] Precedent and Speech 483
Court resist the tendency to treat all speech-restrictive decisions as over-
whelmingly problematic, such that case-by-case analysis morphs into an
“analogical stampede” in which every confrontation between speech and sta-
bility is resolved in favor of the former.282
As we have seen, the Court regularly acknowledges the commonsense
point that some expressions are more valuable than others. The principle of
content sensitivity extends this recognition to the treatment of precedent.
Precedents that restrict the most valuable speech will more readily be over-
ruled. Precedents whose ramifications are limited to less valuable speech will
have a better chance of surviving despite their flaws. In this way, the doctrine
of stare decisis can promote continuity and impersonality even as it allows
the correction of grievous mistakes.
V. Beyond the Freedom of Speech
So far, I have analyzed the Supreme Court’s treatment of speech-related
precedents against the backdrop of its more general statements about stare
decisis. This Part steps back to ask whether the phenomenon I have de-
scribed in the First Amendment context has broader application. The ques-
tion is whether there are pockets of law beyond the freedom of speech in
which the stated rules of stare decisis are effectively suspended.
The fact that the Court has revised several important aspects of its free-
speech doctrine in recent years suggests a particular sensitivity. Certain lan-
guage in the justices’ opinions bolsters that conclusion. As noted above, Jus-
tice Scalia wrote in 2007 that “[t]his Court has not hesitated to overrule
decisions offensive to the First Amendment,” which is “a ‘fixed star in our
constitutional constellation,’ if there is one.”283 The context was the Court’s
reconsideration of McConnell v. FEC, which (among other things) followed
the lead of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce by sustaining a restric-
tion on corporate electioneering.284 Justice Scalia dissented in relevant
part,285 and when the issue reemerged four years later he held to his view
notwithstanding the pull of stare decisis.286 He described McConnell as “un-
workable” and inconsistent with cases that came before it, and he argued
282. Cf. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.
L.J. 1, 27 (1971) (“If the dialectical progression is not to become an analogical stampede, the
protection of the first amendment . . . must be cut off when it reaches the outer limits of
political speech.”).
283. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
284. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204–07 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
285. See id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“I would overrule that part of the Court’s decision in McConnell upholding
§ 203(a) of BCRA.”).
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that neither “reliance interests” nor “cultural impact” provided sufficient
reason for reaffirming the decision.287
Statements like Justice Scalia’s might suggest free speech has a unique
power to overcome restrictive precedents.288 The Court occasionally has ex-
pressed similar sentiments outside the First Amendment context. In Arizona
v. Gant, for example, the Court considered police officers’ authority to
search an automobile after arresting its occupant.289 The Court ruled that
warrantless searches generally are impermissible once the arrestee has been
secured.290 One topic of debate was whether that holding was consistent with
the Court’s previous decision in New York v. Belton, which dealt with auto-
mobile searches following an occupant’s arrest.291 The Gant majority resisted
the idea that it was changing the law as opposed to adopting the most sensi-
ble reading of Belton.292 In response to the argument that many stakeholders
had understood Belton as articulating a general rule that authorized auto-
mobile searches incident to an occupant’s arrest, the Gant majority stated
that “[w]e have never relied on stare decisis to justify the continuance of an
unconstitutional police practice.”293
Writing in dissent, Justice Alito contended that the Gant majority had
overruled Belton.294 He also objected to the majority’s suggestion that stare
decisis is immaterial in cases involving unlawful police procedures. Justice
Alito countered that “the Court cites no authority for the proposition that
stare decisis may be disregarded or provides only lesser protection when the
precedent that is challenged is one that sustained the constitutionality of a
law enforcement practice.”295 Unlike the majority, Justice Alito refused to
287. Id. at 501–03.
288. Cf. Amar, supra note 11, at 1027 (“It is possible to have a robust constitutional de-
mocracy without grand juries as screens against unwanted felony prosecutions. . . . But it is
not possible to have a robust constitutional democracy without a very broad protection of
political expression, opinion formation, and association—without, in other words, something
closely akin to the core of our First Amendment.”).
289. 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
290. Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.
291. 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
292. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (declining to adopt a “broad reading of Belton”).
293. Id. at 348; see also id. at 353 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Justice Alito insists that the
Court must demand a good reason for abandoning prior precedent. That is true enough, but it
seems to me ample reason that the precedent was badly reasoned and produces erroneous (in
this case unconstitutional) results.”).
294. Id. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court refuses to acknowledge that it is
overruling Belton and [a subsequent case that reaffirmed Belton], there can be no doubt that it
does so.”). Writing for the Court in Davis v. United States, Justice Alito reiterated his view that
Gant had revised established law. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424–25 (2011)
(“For years, Belton was widely understood to have set down a simple, bright-line rule. Numer-
ous courts read the decision to authorize automobile searches incident to arrests of recent
occupants, regardless of whether the arrestee in any particular case was within reaching dis-
tance of the vehicle at the time of the search.”).
295. Gant, 556 U.S. at 359 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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elevate freedom from illegal searches above considerations of stare decisis as
a categorical matter.
There are arguable counterpoints to this approach, notably including
the Court’s continued retention of the rule that a criminal defendant’s prior
convictions can be used in subsequent sentencing hearings without being
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.296 Even so, com-
bining the majority opinion in Gant with the First Amendment decisions I
have discussed, we might imagine an argument that precedent must yield
whenever it comes up against a range of individual liberties.297 If this under-
standing of the law is correct, it encompasses a striking exception to the
doctrine of stare decisis—one that significantly qualifies the Court’s express
commitment to precedent and continuity. The Court has the power to revise
its approach to precedent, but any shift should be explicit, and it should be
accompanied by a justification for categorically elevating the protection of
individual liberties over the preservation of continuity.
We can also find shades of Gant in the Court’s discussions of constitu-
tional structure. The Court stated a few decades ago that it has “not hesi-
tated” to overrule precedents that have “departed from a proper
understanding of congressional power under the Commerce Clause.”298
Should we view this as another zone in which stare decisis has no meaning-
ful role to play? The justices’ close attention to precedent in recent disputes
about the Commerce Clause seems to undermine that conclusion.299 Still, it
is an intriguing question whether certain matters of constitutional structure
are so foundational as to transcend the domain of stare decisis. Along simi-
lar lines is Justice Brandeis’ famous statement that precedents are entitled to
less respect in the constitutional context than in the statutory context300—a
distinction the Court has retained even while clarifying that constitutional
decisions warrant presumptive deference.301
296. See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1202 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he exception to trial by jury for establishing ‘the fact of a prior
conviction’ finds its basis not in the Constitution, but in a precedent of this Court.” (citing
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998))); cf. id. at 1201–02 (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) (“The denial of a jury trial on the narrow issues of fact con-
cerning a defendant’s prior conviction history . . . will seldom create any risk of prejudice to
the accused . . . . The doctrine of stare decisis provides a sufficient basis for the denial of
certiorari in these cases.”).
297. See Richard M. Re, Essay, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum. L.
Rev. 1861, 1877 (2014).
298. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 557 (1985).
299. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (opinion
of Roberts, C.J.) (“As expansive as our cases construing the scope of the commerce power have
been, they all have one thing in common: They uniformly describe the power as reaching
‘activity.’ ”); id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgement in part,
and dissenting in part) (“Since 1937, our precedent has recognized Congress’ large authority
to set the Nation’s course in the economic and social welfare realm.”).
300. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) (drawing a distinction between constitutional and statutory precedents).
301. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
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For present purposes, I wish merely to flag these issues and to offer the
beginnings of a response. The curse of stare decisis is that there are always
good reasons to renounce it. By definition, deference to precedent interferes
with interpretations that a justice may otherwise be inclined to adopt. Yet an
equally important part of stare decisis is asking justices to think twice. Per-
haps a prior decision has commanded significant reliance. Perhaps an over-
ruling would run counter to the ideal of the judiciary as an enduring and
impersonal institution. Perhaps today’s judges are actually wrong, and their
predecessors right, about the proper resolution of a constitutional contro-
versy. The central point, mundane as it may be, is this: there are good rea-
sons to depart from flawed precedents, but there are also good reasons to
stand by them. That is true in the First Amendment context as in all others.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of stare decisis depends on a justice’s willingness to
elevate the value of continuity over implementing her best understanding of
a legal command. Such elevation need not occur in every case. But it needs
to happen sometimes if the law is to maintain its cohesiveness and imperson-
ality in a world of interpretive disagreement.
Understood against this backdrop, the doctrine of stare decisis fits un-
easily within a system that constantly treats considerations other than legal
continuity as paramount. If it is always more important to interpret the law
correctly than to keep the law settled, stare decisis loses much of its ability to
foster stability and impersonality. That prospect warrants another look at
the Supreme Court’s recent First Amendment case law. By emphasizing the
significance of unfettered speech, the Court has sought to advance the cause
of expressive liberty. In doing so, however, the Court has implicitly relegated
stability and continuity to a lower tier of constitutional salience.
For some, this state of affairs may be unobjectionable. There is no deny-
ing that robust expression is a core tenet of American legal and political
culture. The claim of this Article is that there is also something to be said for
stare decisis, even when it comes at a hefty price.
